Between illiberalism and hyper-neoliberalism: competing populist discourses in the Czech Republic

Abstract

This paper draws on Laclau's theory of discourse, hegemony, and populism to analyse competing forms of populism in the Czech Republic within the discursive context of 'post-November transformation' as well as in relation to hegemonic struggles over the construction of social order. It is argued that the discourses of Public Affairs (VV), ANO, Dawn of Direct Democracy, and Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) all feature a populist opposition between the 'people' or 'citizens' on the one hand and 'political dinosaurs', ('traditional') 'parties', or 'godfather party mafias' of both 'left' and 'right' on the other, while also radicalizing in different ways the exclusionary constructions of 'work' in the established discourses of the Civic Democrats (ODS) and Social Democrats (ČSSD). While ANO constructs 'hard work' in a populist manner against the ('traditional') 'parties', VV and Dawn/SPD articulate an exclusion of non-working 'unadaptables' that points to a notable interplay of hyper-neoliberal welfare chauvinism and anti-minorities illiberalism.

The return of economic nationalism to East Central Europe: Right‐wing intellectual milieus and anti‐liberal resentment

“…This latter type of state subordinates social policies to national development, spending or intervening as to help “wage‐earners” meet consumption needs, but otherwise subordinating them to their employers and limiting or ignoring their collective organisation (see the Hungarian government's recent [2018] “slave law,” allowing employers to ask staff to work up to 400 hours per year of overtime; Bohle, 2019). Yet a similar model or intellectual current failed to gain elsewhere the influence and power that national‐conservatives hold in Poland and Hungary (Korkut, 2012; Trencsényi, 2014): instead of a fully‐fledged “illiberal turn” as in the case of Poland and Hungary's “national‐conservatives,” the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and the Baltic states feature less severe “illiberal swerve[s]” (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019; Havlík, 2019; Kim, 2020; Mungiu‐Pippidi, 2018).…”

What reduces support for civil liberties: Authoritarianism, national identity, and perceived threat

“…In recent history of this country, we can see several signs of this shift, for example, electing Miloš Zeman, known for his far-right and xenophobic attitudes (Hanley & Vachudova, 2018), in 2013 as a Czech president 2 or the victory of populistic ANO movement in 2017 parliamentary election, whose leader, Andrej Babiš, is known for abusing political power for personal gain (Hanley & Vachudova, 2018;Havlík, 2018). Furthermore, there is a relatively strong support for anti-EU, anti-Islam, illiberal, and socially conservative ideologies in Czech Republic among citizens and politicians (Kim, 2020). These facts can be considered consistent with the long-term trend showing that Czech citizens demonstrate decreasing support for democracy and a slight increase in tolerating authoritarianism (Linek, 2016).…”

Different Strokes for Different Folks: Who Votes for Technocratic Parties?

“…These populist appeals are mixed with explicitly nativist overtones through an emphasis on the threat of immigrants allegedly taking away Czech citizens' jobs, as shown by the slogan "support to families, not to unadaptables. Work to our [people], not to immigrants" (Kim, 2020).…”