The return of economic nationalism to East Central Europe: Right‐wing intellectual milieus and anti‐liberal resentment

Abstract

This article emphasises the non‐economic goals of economic nationalism and in particular its often overlooked political goals. Drawing parallels between economic nationalisms in Central Europe and East Asia, it focuses on Poland and Hungary and asks why did these countries turn to economic nationalism. The article traces this turn to ideational foundations developed by right‐wing intellectuals over the last two decades, arguing that right‐wing intellectuals believed that liberalism has failed what they conceived of its most important (political) purpose, the need of a radical break with the communist past. Based on a study of the writings and careers of leading Polish and Hungarian right‐wing intellectuals, the article draws attention to the nature of the perceived threat to the nation. It contributes to the sociology of nationalism an analysis of how such a threat emerges and translates into a guiding idea of illiberal economic policies.

The Two Faces of the ‘Global Right’: Revolutionary Conservatives and National-Conservatives

“…. ] (Lánczi, 2007: 79) While liberal and neoliberal ideas have dominated the intellectual sphere and economic policymaking in Central and Eastern Europe for two decades after 1989, meanwhile, the intellectual followers of Strauss and Voegelin have raised to influential positions in Poland's PiS and Hungary's Fidesz, the two most prominent political representatives of national-conservatism in present-day Europe (Blokker, 2019;Buzogány and Varga, 2018;Mándi, 2015;Varga, 2021). They have established thought collectives within and around these two parties and these parties' socio-economic policies ideological substance.…”

“…Largely overlooking the tension between pro-workerism and Orbán’s workfarist policies (Szombati, 2018), this programme bridges protectionist ideas aimed at saving US companies from international competition and regulation with the idea of giving trade unions their influence back (Cass, 2018). Despite the strength of anti-state convictions among US conservatives, these did not take issue with the PiS and Fidesz governments’ statist agenda, which includes the re-nationalisations of banks and other strategic enterprises, increased taxation of sectors with strong Western presence or as in Poland, the increase of social expenditures (Orenstein and Bugarič, 2021; Toplišek, 2019; Varga, 2021). Quite to the contrary, US ‘pro-worker’ conservatives distanced themselves from their fierce opposition to tax increases and criticised Trump’s tax breaks (Cass, 2021).…”

Social model or neoliberal champion? Economic visions of the European demos among EU citizens

“…A core finding of these studies was that nationalism is compatible with multiple economic ideologies. Economic nationalism must not imply protectionism (Varga, 2021); rather, it can be based on a commitment to a strong welfare state (Béland & Lecours, 2006; Sunnemark, 2014) or it might use neo‐liberalism as a substrate (Kangas, 2013; OToole, 2003; Peet, 2002). This implies that for most political communities widely different conceptions of economic nationalism can be constructed.…”

Mental Maps of Eastern Europe: States, Mentalities, Modernisation

“…“Lustration” or “transitional justice” debates – and more generally conflicts over how to deal with the communist or Soviet legacy – engulfed most Eastern European societies, translating into an eerie resemblance of their political debates. The issue of statehood was again at the centre, as nationalist fears of losing statehood to an alliance of communists, liberals, and “EU bureaucrats”, loomed large (Blokker, 2019; Bluhm & Varga, 2020; Varga, 2020). 15…”

“…Forces similar to Poland and Hungary's “right‐wing populists” have not kept power elsewhere. The success of such forces in Poland and Hungary thus has more to do with the political struggle between an increasingly weak left and their right‐wing competition than with characteristics of the entire region (Tavits & Letki, 2009; Varga, 2020).…”