Between Disagreement and Consensus: Unravelling the Democratic Paradox

Abstract

The idea of a rational consensus has become an increasingly controversial dimension of recent democratic theory as radical democratic theorists have challenged the ways in which liberal democracies deal with political disagreement and contestation. As a result, several theorists within the liberal tradition have attempted to incorporate models of dissent in their democratic arguments but this paper contends that they tend to result in forms of majoritarianism or proceduralism which reflect the original limitations that inspired the radical democratic critique. A more useful approach is one that recognises that contestation is inherent to democratic politics and understands that the paradox of democracy is the need to embrace the impossibility of establishing rational consensus in democratic practice.

The Australian Citizens' Parliament: forging shared identity through public deliberation

“…Viewed in the larger context of deliberative democracy (see Chambers, 2003; Uhr, 2009), the Citizens' Parliament faced many of the same challenges inherent in deliberative democratic processes, in particular the challenge of working with the conflicting cultural and political vantage points inherent in any pluralistic society (Dryzek, 2005; Levine et al ., 2005). By degrees, deliberation seeks to advance towards a ‘reasoned consensus’ (Habermas, 1984; Cohen, 1989), or at least the more modest kinds of agreement possible in political reality (Little, 2007). Deep and stable cleavages often form between diverse sub‐publics, political cultures and political partisans (Brewer and Stonecash, 2007), with Australia being no exception (McAllister, 2000).…”

Deliberation and protest: strange bedfellows? Revealing the deliberative potential of 2013 protests in Turkey and Brazil

“…He explicitly criticizes Habermas for viewing dissensus as an obstacle for establishing mutual understanding (Rancière 2004). For Rancière, politics is mainly about the conflict over the horizons of perception, expression and comprehension and not about a dialogue based on established forms of perception, expression and comprehension (for a similar argument, see Little 2007).…”

Citizenship Education and the Politics of Public Participation: The Case of Same‐Sex Marriage

“…The tension between universal principles of nondiscrimination, and the democratic willingness to let the public good and public processes be defined by competition among antagonistic conceptions, poses a fundamental problem for citizenship educators. Social studies writers often have dealt with this conundrum by appealing to the public–private distinction, which relegates incompatible differences to the private domain (see Little, 2007, pp. 144–145).…”

“…The public–private distinction domesticates political conflict by mapping public debate onto the pursuit of rational consensus (Labelle, 2001, p. 92). Critics of liberal theory (Little, 2007, p. 145) argue that at least one type of political conflict cannot be contained under this domesticating umbrella, because it arises at the boundary where “private” issues intrude into and seek to reconstitute public space (Fraser, 1997, p. 372). Jacques Rancière argues that the crux of politics lies in contesting the boundaries of the political arena; the conflict between would‐be privatized elements which challenge the limits of political participation and debate, and the policing efforts of established interests to keep them out (Little, 2007, pp.…”

“…Conflicts of this kind are found within Bosniak's inward‐looking domain of citizenship, and include attempts to gain marriage privileges by gay and lesbian couples. Politics, for Rancière, is “the activity of those groups and voices that have been excluded from the polity” (Little, 2007, p. 154). Contrary to Parker, Rancière (2004) opposes politics to consensus:…”