Berkeley and Bodily Resurrection

Abstract

Establishing and defending the Christian faith serves as both a guide and a limit to Berkeley's intriguing metaphysics. I take Berkeley seriously when he says that his aim is to promote the consideration of God and the truth of Christianity. In this paper I discuss and engage Berkeley's superficially weak argument (which I call the natural analogy argument) in defense of the plausibility of the doctrine of bodily resurrection. When his immaterialist resources are properly applied, the argument has more merit than one might initially believe. I conclude by speculating that Berkeley had reason to believe that immaterialism was a better fit with Christianity than materialism.

Berkeleyan idealism and Christian philosophy

“…What constitutes the 'sameness' across time is rather a matter of perceptual qualitative similarities. Thus, as Hight puts it, ‘When God resurrects me, He provides me with the sensory ideas I formerly called my “body.” … Whether or not these ideas are numerically the same as the ones I had prior to my bodily death matters not’ (Hight, , 453; see also Cortez, ).…”

Berkeley’s Philosophy of Religion

“…If this is true, then there will not be any special problem about the identity of resurrection bodies as there is for the materialist (see Hight 2007). (Toland 1696, 27).…”