Believe It or Not – No Support for an Effect of Providing Explanatory or Threat-Related Information on Conspiracy Theories’ Credibility

Abstract

Everyone loves a conspiracy', Dan Brown writes in his world-famous novel The Da Vinci Code (2003: 169), and its sales numbers prove him right (Wyatt, 2005). This observation seems to apply not only to fiction but also to the real world, where conspiracy theories-explanations of past or current phenomena, which accuse a group of powerful individuals of acting in secret to achieve selfish, malevolent goals (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2020b)-are widespread and cover a wide range of topics (e.g., politics,

On the Usefulness of the Conspiracy Mentality Concept

“…As we know from a plethora of research, humans have a strong tendency and a rich arsenal of instruments to engage in belief-consistent information processing (Oeberst & Imhoff, 2023). This perspective is well in line with the findings that conspiracy mentality is associated with the adoption of extremely novel conspiracy theories (emerging quickly after almost any event of at least intermediate relevance) but also completely fictitious ones (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2017; Meuer et al, 2021). Importantly, however, these two perspectives are not mutually exclusive, and both models of causation can be true: conspiracy mentality as an over-generalization of specific beliefs and as an interpretative foil to make sense of (new) aspects of the world.…”

Of precarity and conspiracy: Introducing a socio‐functional model of conspiracy beliefs

“…Instead, we propose that the common underlying theme behind conspiracy narratives, which is that some groups ‘at the top’ of society are trying to deceive or harm those precariously situated ‘at the very bottom’ (Nera et al, 2020 ), matters more to believers. This view fits recent evidence showing that the actual information value of a conspiracy narrative does not influence individuals' endorsement of it (Meuer et al, 2021 ). Instead, we argue that feelings of (dis)trust –rather than perceptions of meaning—may play an important role in understanding how precarity might relate to conspiracy beliefs (van Mulukom et al, 2020 ).…”

Cause and effect: On the antecedents and consequences of conspiracy theory beliefs

“…On the one hand, a large body of evidence suggests that conspiracy theory beliefs are best accounted for by durable predispositions, worldviews, and identities [ 1 ], which predate the adoption of specific beliefs [ 8 ]. Such a perspective tends to put less weight on random exposure as the explanation for conspiracy theory beliefs or associated behaviors [ 6 , 7 ]. On the other hand, many recent studies conceptualize conspiracy theories like a virus (e.g., an info demic), which spreads from person to person [ 20 ], starting with exposure [ 21 ], which then leads to beliefs and behaviors.…”

“…A competing body of literature challenges the presumption of causal linkages, arguing that individuals’ predispositions, worldviews, and identities often predict their exposure to conspiracy theories [ 5 ], their willingness to believe conspiracy theories [ 6 , 7 , 8 ], and their behaviors [ 9 ], simultaneously. Here, we review these different perspectives in the literature, arguing that beliefs and behaviors are the outcomes of complicated and multifaceted processes that defy simplistic causal explanations and that researchers should consider alternative causal pathways in explaining conspiracy theory beliefs and non-normative behaviors.…”