1990
DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.59.4.635
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Beliefs concerning the features of constrained behavior: A basis for the fundamental attribution error.

Abstract: The fundamental attribution error (FAE) was conceptualized in terms of implicit beliefs linking dispositions to features of constrained action. Essays, positionally congruent with their writer's attitude, were judged (by writers and observers) to be stronger, easier to write, and more likely to evoke a correspondent attribution than were incongruent essays. Additional evidence suggested that these judgments reflected a bias directed at confirming expectations generated by the specified attitude. The reverse of… Show more

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Cited by 43 publications
(28 citation statements)
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“…Apparently, this is possible for some individuals because as have pointed out, many subjects do not show the correspondence bias when observing constrained behavior. This suggests that there may be individual difference variables that influ ence the correction process and therefore contribute to the occurrence of the correspondence bias (also see Miller, Ashton, & Mishal, 1990). One such variable may be need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).…”
mentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Apparently, this is possible for some individuals because as have pointed out, many subjects do not show the correspondence bias when observing constrained behavior. This suggests that there may be individual difference variables that influ ence the correction process and therefore contribute to the occurrence of the correspondence bias (also see Miller, Ashton, & Mishal, 1990). One such variable may be need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).…”
mentioning
confidence: 97%
“…So, when a target argues in favor of abortion, observers infer that the target has a pro-choice attitude. This inference is spontaneously made, even when observers are made clear that the target was assigned a position to defend at random (e.g., Gilbert & Jones, 1986;Miller, Ashton, & Mishal, 1990). Observers still draw a correspondent inference because they believe that true beliefs leak through in public claims, even when these are constrained by the situation (Lord, Scott, Pugh, & Desforges, 1997).…”
Section: A Two-step Theory Of the Mere-agreement Effectmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…Participants are then asked to estimate the target's true attitude. Correspondence bias is reflected in the fact that participants tend to ascribe attitudes consistent with the position expressed although the position was randomly assigned (e.g., Jones & Harris, 1967;Miller, Ashton, & Mishal, 1990;Snyder & Jones, 1974).…”
Section: Attitude Attribution and Questioner-contestant Paradigmsmentioning
confidence: 99%