Belief Elicitation: Limiting Truth Telling with Information on Incentives

Danz, David; Wilson, Alistair J.; Vesterlund, Lise

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3621833

“…interest". Following Danz et al (2020), I do not explain the exact monetary incentive structure in advance to reduce errors in belief elicitation. Instead, I tell them that the precise payment rule details are available by request at the end of the experiment.…”

Section: Iq Testmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I incentivize the decision using the binarized scoring rule (Danz et al, 2020;Hossain and Okui, 2013). According to the binarized scoring rule, an individual may earn a fixed payment.…”

Section: Iq Testmentioning

confidence: 99%

Willful Ignorance and Reference-Dependence of Self-Image Concerns

Petrishcheva¹

2021

AEA Randomized Controlled Trials

0

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Self-image concerns play a crucial role in economic decision-making. I conduct a laboratory experiment and offer a theoretical framework to examine whether self-image concerns are reference-dependent and whether individuals react differently to gains and losses in selfimage. I focus on intelligence, a self-image-relevant domain, and find that individuals update their beliefs about performance more strongly if they experience losses than gains in selfimage. On average, individuals tend to avoid self-image-relevant feedback in case of gains and losses in self-image. However, the willingness to acquire self-image-relevant feedback increases if the difference between the posterior and the prior beliefs about performance increases.

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“…interest". Following Danz et al (2020), I do not explain the exact monetary incentive structure in advance to reduce errors in belief elicitation. Instead, I tell them that the precise payment rule details are available by request at the end of the experiment.…”

Section: Iq Testmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I incentivize the decision using the binarized scoring rule (Danz et al, 2020;Hossain and Okui, 2013). According to the binarized scoring rule, an individual may earn a fixed payment.…”

Section: Iq Testmentioning

confidence: 99%

Willful Ignorance and Reference-Dependence of Self-Image Concerns

Petrishcheva¹

2021

AEA Randomized Controlled Trials

0

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Self-image concerns play a crucial role in economic decision-making. I conduct a laboratory experiment and offer a theoretical framework to examine whether self-image concerns are reference-dependent and whether individuals react differently to gains and losses in selfimage. I focus on intelligence, a self-image-relevant domain, and find that individuals update their beliefs about performance more strongly if they experience losses than gains in selfimage. On average, individuals tend to avoid self-image-relevant feedback in case of gains and losses in self-image. However, the willingness to acquire self-image-relevant feedback increases if the difference between the posterior and the prior beliefs about performance increases.

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“…The bonus provides sharp and easily understood incentives, as compared to other schemes such as binarized scoring rules, which have been shown to distort truth telling(Danz et al, 2020).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Memory and Probability

Bordalo¹,

Conlon²,

Gennaioli³

et al. 2021

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People often estimate probabilities, such as the likelihood that an insurable risk will materialize or that an Irish person has red hair, by retrieving experiences from memory. We present a model of this process based on two established regularities of selective recall: similarity and interference. The model accounts for and reconciles a variety of conflicting empirical findings, such as overestimation of unlikely events when these are cued vs. neglect of non-cued ones, the availability heuristic, the representativeness heuristic, as well as over vs. underreaction to information in different situations. The model makes new predictions on how the content of a hypothesis (not just its objective probability) affects probability assessments by shaping the ease of recall. We experimentally evaluate these predictions and find strong experimental support.

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Belief Elicitation: Limiting Truth Telling with Information on Incentives

Cited by 3 publications

References 16 publications

Willful Ignorance and Reference-Dependence of Self-Image Concerns

Willful Ignorance and Reference-Dependence of Self-Image Concerns

Willful Ignorance and Reference-Dependence of Self-Image Concerns

Memory and Probability

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