Belief, delusion, hypnosis, and the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex: A transcranial magnetic stimulation study

Coltheart, Max; Cox, Rochelle E.; Sowman, Paul F.; Morgan, Hannah L.; Barnier, Amanda J.; Langdon, Robyn; Connaughton, Emily; Teichmann, Lina; Williams, Nikolas; Polito, Vince

doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2018.01.001

Cited by 43 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 58 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The last two decades have seen a proliferation of instrumentalist hypnosis research with regard to phenomena like hallucinations ( 36 ), clinical delusions ( 37 – 39 ), clinical confabulation ( 40 ), and functional pain [which is experienced in the absence of any internal or external stimulus or nerve damage; ( 41 )]. In the case of functional pain, for example, the hypnotic analog relation between heat induced pain and the hypnotically induced analog was established by a detailed comparison both at the level of subjective experiences and fMRI-measured brain activity ( 41 , 42 ).…”

Section: The Hypnotic Analog Relationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dreaming, Mind-Wandering, and Hypnotic Dreams

Fazekas

Németh

2020

Front. Neurol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Hobson's AIM theory offers a general framework for thinking about states of consciousness like wakefulness, REM dreaming and NREM mentations in terms of a state space defined by the dimensions of the level of brain activity, the source of input, and the type of neurochemical modulation. This account inspired theoretical models of other altered states of consciousness—including hypnosis—claiming that studying REM dreaming can advance our understanding of these phenomena as well. However, recent developments showed that hypnosis is not a sleep like stage, and that the REM-centric attitude toward dreaming is mistaken. At the same time, the advancement of the neuro-cognitive theory claiming that dreaming and mind-wandering are on a continuum both underlain by default-mode network activity called many aspects of the AIM theory into question. Our aim in this paper is to show that certain hypnotic states—hypnotic dreams (experiences that subjects have in a hypnotic state as a result of an explicit suggestion to have a dream)—can, nevertheless, be highly relevant for the neuro-cognitive theory, and that their comparison with dreaming and mind-wandering has the potential to advance the field in unexpected ways.

show abstract

Section: The Hypnotic Analog Relationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dreaming, Mind-Wandering, and Hypnotic Dreams

Fazekas

Németh

2020

Front. Neurol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…That second factor would not be specific to the delusional content and is not addressed by the present study, though alterations of Lobule VIIa, as detected in this study, may be suggestive of disrupted corticocerebellar control. Neuropsychological studies suggest the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to play a critical role in belief evaluation, and an impairment in this area would be expected [53]. Whether the reported alterations in cognitive/emotional regions of the cerebellum might also contribute to impaired belief evaluation cannot be inferred from our structural data and therefore needs to be specifically addressed by (task-based) functional neuroimaging studies.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 87%

Abnormal cerebellar volume in somatic vs. non-somatic delusional disorders

et al. 2020

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Background: There is abundant evidence for cerebellar involvement in schizophrenia, where the cerebellum has been suggested to contribute to cognitive, affective and motor dysfunction. More recently, specific cerebellar regions have also been associated with psychotic symptoms, particularly with auditory verbal hallucinations. In contrast, little is known about cerebellar contributions to delusions, and even less is known about whether cerebellar involvement differs by delusional content. Methods: Using structural magnetic resonance imaging at 1.0 T together with cerebellum-optimized segmentation techniques, we investigated gray matter volume (GMV) in 14 patients with somatic-type delusional disorder (S-DD), 18 patients with non-somatic delusional disorder (NS-DD) and 18 patients with schizophrenia (SZ) with persistent non-somatic delusions. A total of 32 healthy controls (HC) were included. Between-group comparisons were adjusted for age, gender, chlorpromazine equivalents and illness duration. Results: Compared to HC, S-DD patients showed decreased GMV in left lobule VIIIa. In addition, S-DD patients showed decreased GMV in lobule V and increased GMV in bilateral lobule VIIa/crus II compared to NS-DD. Patients with SZ showed increased GMV in right lobule VI and VIIa/crus I compared to HC. Significant differences between HC and NS-DD were not found. Conclusions: The data support the notion of cerebellar dysfunction in psychotic disorders. Distinct cerebellar deficits, predominantly linked to sensorimotor processing, may be detected in delusional disorders presenting with predominantly somatic content.

show abstract

“…However, two-factor theorists disagree on the precise nature of Factor 2. Some proposals identify Factor 2 with a lesion to the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Coltheart et al 2018) but there is disagreement about whether this locus is specific to delusions or shared with other neuropsychological conditions (see Tranel and Damasio 1994;Corlett 2019). Another open question about two-factor theories is whether Factor 2 contributes to the adoption or to the maintenance of the delusional belief.…”

Section: The Two-factor Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Delusions in the two-factor theory

Lancellotta

Bortolotti

2020

EuJAP

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper we ask whether the two-factor theory of delusions is compatible with two claims, that delusions are pathological and that delusions are adaptive. We concentrate on two recent and influential models of the two-factor theory: the one proposed by Max Coltheart, Peter Menzies and John Sutton (2010) and the one developed by Ryan McKay (2012). The models converge on the nature of Factor 1 but diverge about the nature of Factor 2. The differences between the two models are reflected in different accounts of the pathological and adaptive nature of delusions. We will explore such differences, considering naturalist and normativist accounts of the pathological and focusing on judgements of adaptiveness that are informed by the shear-pin hypothesis (McKay and Dennett 2009). After reaching our conclusions about the two models, we draw more general implications for the status of delusions within two-factor theories. Are there good grounds to claim that delusions are pathological? Are delusions ever adaptive? Can delusions be at the same time pathological and adaptive?

show abstract

Belief, delusion, hypnosis, and the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex: A transcranial magnetic stimulation study

Cited by 43 publications

References 58 publications

Dreaming, Mind-Wandering, and Hypnotic Dreams

Dreaming, Mind-Wandering, and Hypnotic Dreams

Abnormal cerebellar volume in somatic vs. non-somatic delusional disorders

Delusions in the two-factor theory

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About