Dreaming, Mind-Wandering, and Hypnotic Dreams

Abstract

Hobson's AIM theory offers a general framework for thinking about states of consciousness like wakefulness, REM dreaming and NREM mentations in terms of a state space defined by the dimensions of the level of brain activity, the source of input, and the type of neurochemical modulation. This account inspired theoretical models of other altered states of consciousness—including hypnosis—claiming that studying REM dreaming can advance our understanding of these phenomena as well. However, recent developments showed that hypnosis is not a sleep like stage, and that the REM-centric attitude toward dreaming is mistaken. At the same time, the advancement of the neuro-cognitive theory claiming that dreaming and mind-wandering are on a continuum both underlain by default-mode network activity called many aspects of the AIM theory into question. Our aim in this paper is to show that certain hypnotic states—hypnotic dreams (experiences that subjects have in a hypnotic state as a result of an explicit suggestion to have a dream)—can, nevertheless, be highly relevant for the neuro-cognitive theory, and that their comparison with dreaming and mind-wandering has the potential to advance the field in unexpected ways.

Vividness and content

“…Subjective intensity and specificity are also general features that characterise not just mental imagery but online perceptual consciousness and other forms of offline, self‐generated experiences as well (like mind‐wandering, dreaming, etc. ; Fazekas et al, 2020, Fazekas & Nemeth, 2020), thus the proposal conforms to Kind's second desideratum. The facts that these different experiences are often compared and distinguished at the phenomenal level on the basis of their intensity and specificity (Fazekas et al, 2020), and that these factors—under disguises like liveliness and clarity—have traditionally been taken to capture relevant aspects of vividness (McKelvie, 1995a, 1995b) show that Kind's third and fourth requirements are also satisfied.…”

Studying dream experience through dream reports: Points of contact between dream research and first-person methods in consciousness science

“…This shared methodological challenge goes hand in hand with recent proposals to place dreaming and waking mind wandering on a continuum of spontaneous thought (Fox et al, 2013;Christoff et al, 2016). Indeed, there have now been a number of attempts using the same methods to compare the phenomenology and neurophysiology of dreaming and mind wandering (Baird et al, 2022;Carr, Blanchette-Carrière, Solomonova, Paquette, & Nielsen, 2016;Carr & Nielsen, 2015;Fazekas & Nemeth, 2020;Gross et al, 2021;Kunzendorf, Hartmann, Cohen, & Cutler, 1997;Occhionero & Cicogna, 2016;Perogamvros et al, 2017).…”

Диагностические Возможности Анализа Сновидений: Теоретические Предпосылки И Методические Подходы

“…Отчетов о сновидениях, полученных при пробуждении из глубокого сна, достаточно мало (Stickgold, 2013;Chambers, 2017). Эти сновидения качественно отличаются от таковых в быстром сне: они обычно короткие, менее яркие и более концептуальные, в них содержится мало сцен с движением, они более контролируемые и правдоподобные, менее эмоциональные (Fazekas & Nemeth, 2020;Sikka, Valli, Revonsuo & Tuominen, 2021;Ghrouz et al, 2019). Несмотря на многочисленные исследования, свидетельствующие о присутствии сновидений и в медленном, и в быстром сне, все большее число ученых склоняется к мнению, что сновидения присущи только быстрому сну, а во время медленного сна каким-то образом происходит «отражение» или «внедрение» мыслительной активности из быстрого сна (Fagioli, 2002;Fazekas & Nemeth, 2020;Yu et al, 2022).…”