Belief Change as Propositional Update

Elio, Renée; Pelletier, Francis Jeffry

doi:10.1207/s15516709cog2104_2

Cited by 41 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…In reasoning, for example, it is known that revision of factual beliefs is typically difficult (Elio & Pellettier, 1997), as people not only are motivated to maintain a consistent set of beliefs, but also consistent beliefs are a hallmark of rationality. In these cases belief change occurs only as a function of the presentation of information inconsistent with prior beliefs (e.g., Elio & Pelletier, 1997;Johnson-Laird, Girotto, & Legrenzi, 2004) or changes in attitude (Festinger, 1957). There are a variety of reasons that autobiographical beliefs are resistant to change, of This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.…”

Section: Centrality Of Autobiographical Belief In Rememberingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of belief in occurrence within autobiographical memory.

Scoboria¹,

Jackson²,

Talarico³

et al. 2014

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

145

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This article examines the idea that believing that events occurred in the past is a non-memorial decision that reflects underlying processes that are distinct from recollecting events. Research on autobiographical memory has often focused on events that are both believed to have occurred and remembered, thus tending to overlook the distinction between autobiographical belief and recollection. Studying event representations such as false memories, believed-not-remembered events, and non-believed memories shows the influence of non-memorial processes on evaluations of occurrence. Believing that an event occurred and recollecting an event may be more strongly dissociated than previously stated. The relative independence of these constructs was examined in 2 studies. In Study 1, multiple events were cued, and then each was rated on autobiographical belief, recollection, and other memory characteristics. In Study 2, participants described a nonbelieved memory, a believed memory, and a believed-not-remembered event, and they made similar ratings. In both studies, structural equation modeling techniques revealed distinct belief and recollection latent variables. Modeling the predictors of these factors revealed a double dissociation: Perceptual, re-experiencing, and emotional features predicted recollection and not belief, whereas event plausibility strongly predicted belief and weakly predicted recollection. The results show that judgments of autobiographical belief and recollection are distinct, that each is influenced by different sources of information and processes, and that the strength of their relationship varies depending on the type of event under study. The concept of autobiographical belief is elaborated, and implications of the findings are discussed in relation to decision making about events, social influence on memory, metacognition, and recognition processes.

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Section: Centrality Of Autobiographical Belief In Rememberingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of belief in occurrence within autobiographical memory.

Scoboria¹,

Jackson²,

Talarico³

et al. 2014

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

145

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Belief change is a complex process by which rational agents shift from one belief state to another as a way to improve their knowledge [1]. Every day we deal with a lot of information coming from different sources that may have an impact on our belief system.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Belief Revision and Delusions: How Do Patients with Schizophrenia Take Advice?

et al. 2012

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The dominant cognitive model that accounts for the persistence of delusional beliefs in schizophrenia postulates that patients suffer from a general deficit in belief revision. It is generally assumed that this deficit is a consequence of impaired reasoning skills. However, the possibility that such inflexibility affects the entire system of a patient's beliefs has rarely been empirically tested. Using delusion-neutral material in a well-documented advice-taking task, the present study reports that patients with schizophrenia: 1) revise their beliefs, 2) take into account socially provided information to do so, 3) are not overconfident about their judgments, and 4) show less egocentric advice-discounting than controls. This study thus shows that delusional patients' difficulty in revising beliefs is more selective than had been previously assumed. The specificities of the task and the implications for a theory of delusion formation are discussed.

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“…The results of these studies allow us to modulate Elio and Pelletier's (1997) conclusion that people are generally willing to revise a conditional belief, in some very informative ways. The first factor concerns the effect of embedding a conditional belief in a system of consistent relations.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, as was pointed out by Elio and Pelletier (1997), the method used in these studies does not provide any insight into how people reason with 'real, as opposed to verbally presented, beliefs. They suggest that people may more easily abandon a relational belief than a contradictory observation, and that this tendency increases as the degree of belief in the conditional relation decreases.…”

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confidence: 93%

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What Makes People Revise Their Beliefs Following Contradictory Anecdotal Evidence?: The Role of Systemic Variability and Direct Experience

Markovits¹,

Schmeltzer²

2007

Cognitive Science

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The extent to which belief revision is affected by systematic variability and direct experience of a conditional (if A then B) relation was examined in two studies. The first used a computer generated apparatus. This presented two rows of 5 objects. Pressing one of the top objects resulted in one of the bottom objects being lit up. The 139 adult participants were given one of two levels of experience (5 or 15 trials) and one of two types of apparatus. One of these was completely uniform, while the other had an element that randomly alternated in its result. Following the testing of the apparatus, participants were asked to rate their certainty of the action of the middle element, which was always uniform (the AB belief). Then they were told of an observation inconsistent with this belief. Participants were then asked whether they considered the AB belief or the anecdotal observation to be more believable. Results showed that increased experience decreased the tendency to reject the AB belief, when the apparatus did not have any randomness. However, the presence of a single element showing random variation in the system strongly increased rejection of this belief. A second study looked at the effect of a single random element on a mechanical system as well as an electronic system using graphical representations. This confirmed the generality of the effect of randomness on belief revision, and provided support for the effects of embedding a belief into a system of relations. These results provide some insight into the complex factors that determine belief revision.

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Belief Change as Propositional Update

Cited by 41 publications

References 47 publications

The role of belief in occurrence within autobiographical memory.

The role of belief in occurrence within autobiographical memory.

Belief Revision and Delusions: How Do Patients with Schizophrenia Take Advice?

What Makes People Revise Their Beliefs Following Contradictory Anecdotal Evidence?: The Role of Systemic Variability and Direct Experience

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