In this study, we examined whether adult subjects' beliefs regarding the empirical truth of a conclusion affected their production as well as their evaluation of a logical conclusion in a reasoning task. In addition, the relation between the ability to resolve an abstract reasoning problem correctly and the effect of belief-bias was examined. The subjects were given one of four paper-andpencil reasoning tasks, two of them using an evaluation paradigm, and two of them using a production paradigm. Each paradigm comprised either neutral problems or belief problems. The neutral problems were constructed to be as similar as possible to the belief problems, in order to control for extraneous factors. All four tasks also included an abstract reasoning problem. The results indicate a significant belief-bias effect for both the evaluation and the production tasks. Qualitative analysis indicated that the belief-bias effect was more pervasive in the production condition. In addition, the belief-bias effect was found to exist independently of the subjects' abstract reasoning ability. The results are discussed with reference to a two-stage model, in which belief is used to resolve uncertainties in inferentially produced conclusions.
A total of 512 children in Grades 1 through 6 received a conditional inference task using causal conditionals (If cause P, then effect Q) and a generation of alternatives task. The inference task used premises for which there were few or many possible alternative causes. Results show a steady age-related increase in uncertainty responses to the two uncertain logical forms, affirmation of consequent (AC) and denial of antecedent (DA), and an increase in production of disabling conditions for modus ponens. More uncertainty responses were produced to AC and DA with premises with many possible alternatives. Individual differences in inference production were related to numbers of alternatives produced in the generation task. Results support the idea that both developmental and individual differences in reasoning can be at least partially explained by differential access to knowledge stored in long-term memory.
Theoretical models based on primate evidence suggest that social structure determines the costs and benefits of particular aggressive strategies. In humans, males more than females interact in groups of unrelated same-sex peers, and larger group size predicts success in inter-group contests. In marked contrast, human females form isolated one-on-one relationships with fewer instrumental benefits, so social exclusion constitutes a more useful strategy. If this model is accurate, then human social exclusion should be utilized by females more than males and females should be more sensitive to its occurrence. Here we present four studies supporting this model. In Study 1, using a computerized game with fictitious opponents, we demonstrate that females are more willing than males to socially exclude a temporary ally. In Study 2, females report more actual incidents of social exclusion than males do. In Study 3, females perceive cues revealing social exclusion more rapidly than males do. Finally, in Study 4, females’ heart rate increases more than males’ in response to social exclusion. Together, results indicate that social exclusion is a strategy well-tailored to human females’ social structure.
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