Belief as the Power to Judge

The Instrumental Rule

“…Yet I might not. (Koziolek [2018: 2–4] discusses the importance of this case for an account of belief.) Perhaps it slips my mind because of the whirl of life.…”

The Normative/Agentive Correspondence

“…23 McDowell (1994), however, has suggested an alternate way of thinking about the Kantian distinction between intuitions and concepts in which our conceptual capacities are already in play in our having of intuitions, where this is still importantly distinct from our actually making judgments, actively applying concepts to objects that we have in view in experience. 24 Now, McDowell has wavered over the years on how exactly the distinction between intuitions and concepts is to be understood. 25 Here, I'll offer my own way of articulating this distinction, principally employing the statuses of 23 This, Brandom thinks, is what it is for Kant's distinction between intuitions and concepts to be a "hylomorphic" one, a distinction between non-conceptual "matter" and conceptual "form".…”

“…For a reading of Kantian hylomorphism that is closer to the one I am suggesting here, see Boyle's "Kant's Hylomorphism" (M.S.). 24 McDowell's contrasts his view with a view of the sort advanced by Lewis by saying "conceptual capacities are drawn on in receptivity [. .…”

“…See also Rödl (2007Rödl ( , 2019 and Boyle (2009) for a related account. Notably, Koziolek (2018aKoziolek ( , 2018b) pushes back against this sort of account, arguing that it glosses over an important agentive modal (as well as temporal) distinction to be made between the notion of judgment and the notion of belief. On Koziolek's account, a belief is not an act but a capacity, specifically, the capacity to judge.…”