The Instrumental Rule

Fix, Jérémy

doi:10.1017/apa.2020.3

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…See Ford (2011: 83-90). 8 See Fix (2020b). 9 'In part' because I am not trying to say everything about the nature of practical reason.…”

Section: The Self-conscious Willmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Unity of Normative Thought

Fix

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Practical cognitivism is the view that practical reason is our will, not an intellectual capacity whose exercises can influence those of our will. If practical reason is our will, thoughts about how I am to act have an essential tie to action. They are intentions. Thoughts about how others are to act, though, lack such a tie to action. They are beliefs, not intentions. How, then, can these thoughts form a unified class? I reject two answers which deny the differences between such thoughts about myself and those about others, one of which says that all such thoughts are intentions, the other that all are beliefs. I then reject a shared assumption which says that a class of those is unified only if all its elements are all of one type of thought. I instead argue that this class is unified even though some elements are intentions, others beliefs, because such beliefs depend on those intentions in various ways.

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“…See Ford (2011: 83-90). 8 See Fix (2020b). 9 'In part' because I am not trying to say everything about the nature of practical reason.…”

Section: The Self-conscious Willmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Unity of Normative Thought

Fix

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…17 17 I offer a related but distinct argument in response to certain arguments by Sarah Paul in (Fix, 2020b, 453–4). See (Paul, 2013, 295–6, et passim ). …”

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“…5. 5. See (Fix, 2020b). As this is only a necessary condition on the correctness of an exercise of practical reason, this is only a partial explanation of the practical cognitivist account of that capacity.…”

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Practical cognition as volition

Fix

2021

European J of Philosophy

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Practical cognitivism is the view that practical reason is the self‐conscious will and that practical cognition is self‐conscious volition. This essay addresses two puzzles for practical cognitivism. In akratic action, I act as I understand is illegitimate and not as I understand is legitimate. In permissible action, I act as I understand is legitimate and also do not act as I understand is legitimate. In both types of action, practical cognition seems to come apart from volition. How, then, can practical reason be our will and practical cognition be volition? Practical cognitivists can solve these puzzles because the claims that practical reason is our will and that practical cognition is volition are about the nature of a capacity, and the nature of a capacity establishes standards of correctness for its exercises. Akratic action is a type of erroneous exercise of practical reason as tripping is an erroneous exercise our capacity to walk. Permissible action is a successful exercise of practical reason as stepping first with my right foot rather than my left is a successful exercise of my capacity to walk. The puzzles of akratic and permissible action do not refute practical cognitivism.

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The Unity of the Moral Domain

Fix

2024

European J of Philosophy

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What is the function of morality—what is it all about? What is the basis of morality—what explains our moral agency and patiency? This essay defends a unique Kantian answer to these questions. Morality is about securing our independence from each other by giving each other equal discretion over whether and how we interact. The basis of our moral agency and patiency is practical reason. The first half addresses objections that this account cannot explain the moral patiency of beings who are not also moral agents such as infantile, elderly, and infirm human beings and the other animals. The second half argues that this account is preferable, on grounds of consistency with the basic Kantian account of the function and content of morality, to the familiar account of our moral patiency, popular especially though not exclusively with contemporary Kantians, in terms of the value of humanity.

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The Instrumental Rule

Cited by 3 publications

References 39 publications

The Unity of Normative Thought

The Unity of Normative Thought

Practical cognition as volition

The Unity of the Moral Domain

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