Being one of us. Group identification, joint actions, and collective intentionality

Salice, Alessandro; Miyazono, Kengo

doi:10.1080/09515089.2019.1682132

Cited by 19 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 60 publications

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“…This observation also pertains to our own account of shared intentionality: some of the psychological preconditions, which we have described, are of course not available capacities in infancy and early childhood [see ( 27 )]. Rather, they emerge fairly late in psychological development and thus arguably hinge on other, more basic factors.…”

Section: Autism Spectrum Disordermentioning

confidence: 67%

“…According to this view, “sharing” does not point to just one thing, as it were; rather, there are different ways in which mental states like intentions can be shared [authors endorsing this idea include ( 3 , 25 , 26 ), among others]. In the following, we develop a conceptual framework that aims at capturing two different ways of sharing intentions [see ( 10 , 27 , 28 )].…”

Section: Joint and We-intentionality And Their Core Featuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We subsume the process of acquiring a self-understanding as group member and the capacity to adopt the group's perspective under the umbrella term of “group identification” [( 27 ); see also ( 49 , 50 )]. We will elaborate on the issue of group identification in the next sections, but it should be emphasized already now that group identification may happen even in the absence of previous interaction among the agents.…”

Section: Joint and We-intentionality And Their Core Featuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Disturbances of Shared Intentionality in Schizophrenia and Autism

Salice

Henriksen

2021

Front. Psychiatry

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Schizophrenia and autism are today considered complex spectrum disorders characterized by difficulties in social behavior. Drawing on recent advances in collective or shared intentionality studies, we present a novel theoretical approach to these social difficulties by exploring them from the angle of shared intentionality. We begin by describing two forms of shared intentionality: joint intentionality and we-intentionality. Joint intentionality crucially relies on the agents' mentalizing abilities such as mind reading and the ability to factor in (or “to be moved” by) their partner's intentions in deliberation and action planning. By contrast, we-intentionality relies on the agents' capacity to understand themselves as group members and to adopt the group's perspective. In schizophrenia spectrum disorders, we propose that joint intentionality remains unaffected, but we-intentionality may be impaired. In severe autism spectrum disorder (i.e., infantile autism), we propose that both forms of shared intentionality are impaired. We suggest that the source of the problems affecting we-intentionality in schizophrenia spectrum disorders lies primarily in trait-like, anomalous self-experiences. In severe autism spectrum disorder, we suggest that problems with mind reading, the ability to “be moved” by others' intentions, and with the capacity for perspective-taking impede both forms of shared intentionality.

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Section: Autism Spectrum Disordermentioning

confidence: 67%

Section: Joint and We-intentionality And Their Core Featuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Joint and We-intentionality And Their Core Featuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Disturbances of Shared Intentionality in Schizophrenia and Autism

Salice

Henriksen

2021

Front. Psychiatry

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“…If you have an individual concern as a faculty member for the reputation of your department, then you-at least indirectly or implicitly-understand yourself and your colleagues as members of the same department. The same happens in the case in which the concern is not simply yours or mine, but is ours: here the identification with the group is direct and more intense (on group identification and its different forms, see Salice & Miyazono, 2019;Salice & Montes Sánchez, 2019). Now, even when the esteemers are not conceived of as ingroup members by the esteemed at time t, when they manifest their esteem at time t', they signal the values they endorse.…”

Section: Self-esteem and Social Esteemmentioning

confidence: 92%

Self-Esteem, Social Esteem, and Pride

Salice

2020

Emotion Review

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This article explores self-esteem as an episodic self-conscious emotion. Episodic self-esteem is first distinguished from trait self-esteem, which is described as an enduring state related to the subject’s sense of self-worth. Episodic self-esteem is further compared with pride by claiming that the two attitudes differ in crucial respects. Importantly, episodic self-esteem—but not pride—is a function of social esteem: in episodic self-esteem, the subject evaluates herself in the same way in which others evaluate her. Furthermore, social esteem elicits episodic self-esteem if the values at the basis of the others’ evaluation are shared by the subject. Such sharing of values suggests that only the evaluations of those others that the subject frames as her in-group members are relevant to episodic self-esteem.

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“…The account provided by Tomasello and Warneken has not been without criticisms. One of the crucial issues that various authors have pointed out is that using the Bratmanian theoretical model commits the view to a cognitively very demanding account of early cooperative behavior (see Tollefsen 2005; Brownell 2011; Pacherie 2013; Michael et al 2016; Salice and Miyazono 2019; Satne and Salice 2020; Zahavi and Satne 2015). 17 In particular, the account needs to presuppose a very early understanding of the notion of intention, as applied to herself and others, which is implausible for such an early age, especially so since that understanding might be thought to spring from early interactions with other agents rather than being presupposed by them.…”

Section: On the Emergence Of Helping Behavior In Ontogenymentioning

confidence: 99%