… Because the homeland cannot be in opposition: analysing the discourses of Fidesz and Law and Justice (PiS) from opposition to power

Kim, Seongcheol

doi:10.1080/21599165.2020.1791094

Cited by 29 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…7 Founded as a liberal party, Fidesz gradually embraced populism as a means to become hegemonic in the right-wing camp (Enyedi 2015). Relying on this new platform, articulated around the need for regaining national independence in the wake of the global financial crisis, Fidesz has been in power since 2010, obtaining a two-thirds parliamentary majority in three consecutive elections (Kim 2020).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Post-Neoliberalism and External Financial Liberalization: Comparing Left-Wing and Right-Wing Populism

Silva

2021

Gov. & oppos.

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This article aims to discuss to what extent populist parties with opposite ideological backgrounds have differed in their policies towards inherited external financial liberalization (EFL). Building upon a comparative case study centred on Argentina under Kirchnerism (2003–15) and Hungary under Viktor Orbán (since 2010), I conclude that both experiences led to a partial EFL reversal. However, reflecting their opposite ideological underpinnings, each subtype of populism opted to restrict a different dimension of EFL. Argentina's left-wing populism re-regulated cross-border capital flows, harming financial operators, foreign investors and primary exporters through capital controls and export surrenders. These interventionist capital account regulations were needed to shield expansionary macroeconomic policies that attended the interests of subordinate socioeconomic strata, fuelling the tension with financial markets and domestic economic elites. Conversely, Hungary's right-wing populism focused on the ownership structure of the banking sector, aiming to redistribute assets from foreign to domestic private banks and improve the credit conditions for native capitalists. In this case, even when resorting to macroeconomic heterodoxy, the maintenance of fiscal balance and price stability retained support from both foreign investors and domestic business groups, mitigating tensions derived from financial nationalism.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Post-Neoliberalism and External Financial Liberalization: Comparing Left-Wing and Right-Wing Populism

Silva

2021

Gov. & oppos.

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“…While he did leave office, he never fully accepted electoral defeat. Instead, he openly stated that "the homeland cannot be in opposition," seemingly equating Fidesz (and himself) to the Hungarian nation (Kim 2021). From that moment on, Orbán devoted his time to making sure that this would never happen again.…”

Section: The Hungarian Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The government survived but lost most of its public support, and Fidesz remained mobilized and radicalized. For instance, in 2007, Orbán stated, "The people has the right to oust the government in a democracy too if it governs against the will of the people, if it endangers the existential interest of the people" (quoted in Kim 2021).…”

Section: The Hungarian Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Far-Right Threat in the United States: A European Perspective

Mudde¹

2022

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Scie

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The rise of Donald Trump has weakened the dominance of the “American exceptionalism” paradigm in analyses of U.S. politics, but the pivot to views of the United States as part of a global trend toward democratic backsliding ignores important, uniquely “American” cultural, historical, and institutional attributes that make the country more at risk for democratic erosion than most other established democracies. This short article puts Trump, and his Republican Party, into the broader comparative perspective of (European) far-right studies. I argue that Trump in many ways fits the “fourth wave” of postwar far-right politics, lay out the unique challenge that the United States is facing in terms of democratic erosion, and draw on the case of Viktor Orbán in Hungary to learn lessons for the United States. The article ends with some suggestions of how democrats (not just Democrats) should address the far-right Republican challenge to U.S. democracy.

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“…On the other hand, Fidesz propagates submission to those in power, emphasizing, e.g., traditional gender roles, which place women in inferior positions to men (Vida, 2019). Most importantly, they require total political submission to the "homeland" and its "people, " crushing subnational capacity for institutional resilience, destroying the independent judiciary, and taking full control of the media landscape (Jakli and Stenberg, 2021;Seongcheol, 2021).…”

Section: The Rise Of the Illiberal Democracy: The Hungarian Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

“The New State That We Are Building”: Authoritarianism and System-Justification in an Illiberal Democracy

2021

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The authoritarian personality is characterized by unquestionining obedience and respect to authority. System justification theory (SJT) argues that people are motivated to defend, bolster, and justify aspects of existing social, economic, and political systems. Commitment to the status quo is also a key characteristic of the authoritarian personality. It can be argued that the social context matters for how an underlying latent authoritarian character is expressed. This means that authoritarian regimes could be expected to lead to increased authoritarianism and stronger system-justification. We investigated this hypothesis in two representative samples of Hungarians, collected before (2010) and after (2018) 8 years of Fidesz’ rule (N = 1,000 in both samples). Moreover, the strong version of SJT argues that members of disadvantaged groups are likely to experience the most cognitive dissonance and that the need to reduce this dissonance makes them the most supportive of the status quo. This argument dovetails nicely with claims made by the political opposition to Fidesz, according to which Fidesz is especially popular among low-status members of society. We found that measures assessing authoritarian tendencies did not change between 2010 and 2018. However, more specific beliefs and attitudes did change, and these effects were especially pronounced among Fidesz supporters. Their belief in a just world and a just system has grown stronger, while their attitudes toward migrants had hardened. Low status was associated with lower levels of system-justifying ideologies. However, low status Fidesz voters justified the system more than high status opposition voters in 2018, lending some support for the strong version of SJT. Our results suggest that beliefs and attitudes of Hungarians have changed between 2010 and 2018, and that political leadership played a crucial role in this.

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… Because the homeland cannot be in opposition: analysing the discourses of Fidesz and Law and Justice (PiS) from opposition to power

Cited by 29 publications

References 31 publications

Post-Neoliberalism and External Financial Liberalization: Comparing Left-Wing and Right-Wing Populism

Post-Neoliberalism and External Financial Liberalization: Comparing Left-Wing and Right-Wing Populism

The Far-Right Threat in the United States: A European Perspective

“The New State That We Are Building”: Authoritarianism and System-Justification in an Illiberal Democracy

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