Basic Land Security and Livelihood: A Study of Compensation and Social Security Policy for Land‐expropriated Peasants in China

Abstract

SUMMARY Frequently, the discourses on land management and social security policy are kept separate from each other. Access to vital land uses or tenure security, however, are not only relevant to land policy and urban planning but are also important elements of social security policy. Land use planners and policymakers have a huge impact on spaces of poverty and the well‐being of the poor. How can we better understand the relationship between land policy and social security policy? In recent years, global discourses on sustainable development, the Millennium Development Goals or universal human rights increasingly have considered the relationship between land rights and poverty alleviation. The paper will discuss how China framed social security policy with respect to housing, tenure security, urban and rural ownership, improvement of slums, the land rights of women and access to common land. Does the country directly or indirectly link land security to social security policy? In conclusion, the paper will discuss how land security could be contained into the minimum social assistance policy and what the approaching path is in China. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Property rights and the mystery of capital: A review of de Soto’s simplistic solution to development

“…establishing various private titles has also been associated with disadvantage to some within customary groups, with elites gaining the greater benefits and in some cases women being excluded (Joireman, 2008). Similar arguments are made regarding the alienation and privatization of some state/collective urban and rural land in China (cf Yang, 2012). Formalizing title might open opportunities for alienation of property to international corporations or wealthier groups, which may move agriculture to large scale commodity production, or change tenure rights in housing, which may not assist the poor (De Schutter, 2011;Manders, 2004).…”

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“…Therefore, "public interest" becomes a highly abstract concept in China (and many other countries). Consequently, in the current context, local governments may expropriate land either without taking the public interest into account or with compensations far below the standard stipulated by law, thereby depriving farmers' rights and interests [35,36]. The process of expropriation often involves either threats of violence or actual violence, and attempts by expropriated farmers to protest against perceived injustice can be blocked in various ways [37].…”

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“…Land serves beyond purely efficiency or market uses, providing housing and subsidence to community members (Yang, 2012). Moreover, in some cases, land is re-allocated depending on changing family sizes, returnees from urban migration, and other issues, with this supported by peasants, despite it being formally illegal (Kong & Unger, 2013).…”

“…Expropriated land has often been passed on for huge profits, at a median price at ten times the compensatory price and sometimes as much as 40 times (Keliang & Prosterman, 2012). With the distinction between state and private actors often hard to make, state expropriation for 'public good' is sometimes the quasi-legal enrichment of already powerful elites (Yang, 2012). The number of protests -187 000 in 2010 alone with protests continuing into 2015; two thirds of which were related to rural land issues -suggests expropriation has been strongly resisted (Hoffman & Sullivan, 2015).…”

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