Base Rate Effects on the Interpretation of Probability and Frequency Expressions

Prior expectation and the interpretation of natural language quantifiers

“…Clearly, the smaller difference would be far harder to detect empirically. Although the present design, being between subjects, decreases the likelihood of detecting such a change even further, note that Pepper and Prytulak (1974) and Wallsten et al (1986b), using withinsubjects designs, found essentially the same rsults as we did for quantifiers. Unfortunately, the alternatives cannot easily be distinguished by either type of design.…”

“…These observations fit well with the findings of Pepper and Prytulak (1974) for frequency adverbs and probability expressions, in that prior expectation influences quantifier interpretations. As with Pepper and Prytulak, the effect is due to the influence of low prior expectations, and is essentially restricted to quantifiers which indicate large rather than small proportions (also obtained by Wallsten et al, 1986b). The present results cannot be explained by withinsubjects contextual phenomena, since the design was entirely between subjects.…”

The Effect of Catastrophe Potential on the Interpretation of Numerical Probabilities of the Occurrence of Hazards1

“…One might even argue that, unless one focuses on rank orders, without a context, interpretations of probability expressions do not make much sense. Context may be provided, for instance, by the perceiver's knowledge and experience (e.g., Beyth-Marom, 1982;Wallsten, Fillenbaum, & Cox, 1986), the goal of communication (e.g., Budescu & Wallsten, 1990), gain/loss frames (Budescu, Weinberg, & Wallsten, 1988), the presence of multiple alternatives (Teigen, 1988b), or the way that probabilities are presented (Stone, Yates, & Parker, 1994). An important category of context factors may be characteristics of the stimulus domain (e.g., Brun Wallsten, Fillenbaum, & Cox, 1986).…”

Assessing Risk and Prioritizing Referral for Self‐Harm: When and Why is my Judgement Different from Yours?

“…Two key points are worth considering in relation to the ambiguity of language implied by these results. First, how people interpret terms like ‘low’, ‘moderate’ and ‘high’, which imply comparisons of magnitude, will inevitably vary between contexts—people do not interpret that a ‘high probability of rain’ and a ‘high probability of flooding’ imply equal, or even similar, chances of an event occurring (Wallsten, Fillenbaum, & Cox, ). However, here, seemingly within the same context, different individuals ascribe very different numerical probabilities to the same verbal term.…”