Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory

Laruelle, Annick; Valenciano, Federico

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.004

Cited by 36 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…In particular, such results have been demonstrated in Hart and MasColell (1996), Laruelle and Valenciano (2007), Miyakawa (2008), Kultti and Vartiainen (2010), and Britz, Herings and Predtetchinski (2010) under increasingly weaker conditions. Definition 7.3 The Nash product is the function ρ : X → R defined by…”

Section: Procedurally Fair Taxationmentioning

confidence: 68%

“…The literature on multi-lateral bargaining with unanimous agreement has shown convergence of bargaining equilibrium proposals to the Nash bargaining solution (Hart and Mas-Colell (1996), Laruelle and Valenciano (2007), Miyakawa (2008), Kultti and Vartiainen (2010), and Britz, Herings and Predtetchinski (2010)). Unfortunately, all these papers need differentiability assumptions with respect to the set of feasible alternatives, an assumption that is clearly violated for the set of feasible taxation schemes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Procedurally Fair Income Taxation Schemes

Herings

Predtetchinski

2011

SSRN Journal

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We study the implications of procedural fairness on income taxation. All taxation schemes are allowed for, up to the constraints implied by incentive compatibility and budget balance. We formulate procedural fairness as a particular non-cooperative bargaining game and examine the stationary subgame perfect equilibria of the game. The equilibrium outcome is called tax equilibrium and is shown to be unique. Procedurally fair taxation schemes are defined as the taxation schemes that result in the limit of tax equilibria when the probability that negotiations break down converges to zero. The procedurally fair taxation scheme is shown to be unique. It is shown to correspond to the taxation scheme resulting from the Nash bargaining solution and leads to full redistribution of income.

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Section: Procedurally Fair Taxationmentioning

confidence: 68%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Procedurally Fair Income Taxation Schemes

Herings

Predtetchinski

2011

SSRN Journal

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“…In particular, such results have been demonstrated in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996), Laruelle and Valenciano (2007), Miyakawa (2008), Kultti andVartiainen (2010), andBritz et al (2010) under increasingly weaker conditions.…”

Section: Definition 72mentioning

confidence: 81%

“…We are interested in the uniqueness and the characterization of the limit proposal. The literature on multilateral bargaining with unanimous agreement has shown convergence of bargaining equilibrium proposals to the Nash bargaining solution, see Hart and Mas-Colell (1996), Laruelle and Valenciano (2007), Miyakawa (2008), Kultti and Vartiainen (2010), and Britz et al (2010). Unfortunately, all these papers need differentiability assumptions with respect to the set of feasible alternatives, an assumption that is clearly violated in the presence of monotonicity constraints.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bargaining under monotonicity constraints

Herings

Predtetchinski

2015

Econ Theory

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We study unanimity bargaining on the division of a surplus in the presence of monotonicity constraints. The monotonicity constraints specify a complete order on the players, which has to be respected by the shares in the surplus the players obtain in any bargaining outcome. A player higher in the order should not receive a lower share of the surplus. We analyze the resulting subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies and show that they are characterized by the simpler notion of bargaining equilibrium. Bargaining equilibria are shown to be unique and to have the property that players ranked strictly higher obtain strictly higher shares in the surplus. The key question is whether the bargaining advantage of a higher-ranked player persists when the probability of breakdown of bargaining tends to zero. We argue that such is not the case by showing that bargaining equilibria have a unique limit equal to an equal division of the surplus. It then follows that the limit also coincides with the Nash bargaining solution for this problem.

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“…In Laruelle and Valenciano (2007), we provide an interpretation of the Shapley-Shubik (1954) index as a measure of the 'bargaining power' that a voting rule gives to each member of a committee. It is assumed that the committee negotiates in search of consensus under the condition that every winning coalition can impose any agreement.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%