Cooperative bargaining foundations of the Shapley–Shubik index

Laruelle, Annick; Valenciano, Federico

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.03.002

Cited by 7 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 20 publications

(33 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The authors model noncooperative bargaining processes and show how the power indices (i.e. the Shapley-Shubik index) can be interpreted as measures of bargaining power that appear as limit cases (see also [23] for cooperative bargaining foundation of this index).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Influence functions, followers and command games

Grabisch

Rusinowska

2011

Games and Economic Behavior

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. We study and compare two frameworks: a model of influence, and command games. In the influence model, in which players are to make a certain acceptance/rejection decision, due to influence of other players, the decision of a player may be different from his inclination. We study a relation between two central concepts of this model: influence function, and follower function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a follower function, and we describe the structure of the set of all influence functions that lead to a given follower function. In the command structure introduced by Hu and Shapley, for each player a simple game called the command game is built. One of the central concepts of this model is the concept of command function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a command function, and describe the minimal sets generating a normal command game. We also study the relation between command games and influence functions. A sufficient and necessary condition for the equivalence between an influence function and a normal command game is delivered.JEL Classification: C7, D7

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Influence functions, followers and command games

Grabisch

Rusinowska

2011

Games and Economic Behavior

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Consensus versus Dichotomous Voting

Laruelle

Valenciano

2011

Consensual Processes

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Toward a Unified Negotiation Framework: Leveraging Strengths in Behavioral and Computational Communities

Turan

Dai

Sycara

et al. 2013

Models for Intercultural Collaboration and Negotiation

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. While there has been a large body of negotiation literature in both Behavioral Science (behavioral) and Artificial Intelligence/Game Theory (computational) communities, there has not been an attempt to bridge the two communities to our best knowledge. In this paper, we compare and contrast the characteristics of behavioral and computational literature in negotiation. We discover that incorporating the strengths of two types of literature are valuable in expanding the horizon of research outlook.

show abstract

Cooperative bargaining foundations of the Shapley–Shubik index

Cited by 7 publications

References 20 publications

Influence functions, followers and command games

Influence functions, followers and command games

Consensus versus Dichotomous Voting

Toward a Unified Negotiation Framework: Leveraging Strengths in Behavioral and Computational Communities

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About