2020
DOI: 10.1007/s10726-020-09685-z
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Bargaining Game with Altruistic and Spiteful Preferences

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Cited by 11 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…It should be noted that the discount factor here is different from the discount rate in finance. It represents the "patience" or "bargaining power" of the participants and is generally related to the competitiveness, negotiation ability, and risk preference of the participants [43,44]. We assume that the discount factors of the supplier and the manufacturer are σ S and Mathematical Problems in Engineering…”
Section: Profit-distribution Contract Designmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It should be noted that the discount factor here is different from the discount rate in finance. It represents the "patience" or "bargaining power" of the participants and is generally related to the competitiveness, negotiation ability, and risk preference of the participants [43,44]. We assume that the discount factors of the supplier and the manufacturer are σ S and Mathematical Problems in Engineering…”
Section: Profit-distribution Contract Designmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In game theory, several approaches [6,22] explore altruistic and spiteful actions (the term of art for cooperation and conflict) by means of linear combinations of pay-offs. Work of Levine [6] is mathematically equivalent to the level 1 Social MDPs defined in Tejwani et al [5], while level 2 Social MDPs seem to have no counterpart in the current economics literature.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The recent approach [43] uses a logistic regression for modelling the opponent, that requires collecting significant amount of data for learning and initialisation. Paper [44] uses a similar utility based on the bargaining principles though constructs a subgame that relies on the perfect equilibrium. The closely related work, dealt with opponent modelling, is probably [45].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%