Bargaining equilibrium in a two-echelon supply chain with a capital-constrained retailer

Yang, Huijie; Yan, Qiang; Wan, Hong; Zhuo, Wenyan

doi:10.3934/jimo.2019077

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…Optimal policies. By referring to the literature [39,4,30,16,33,35,41], we try to solve the constructed models and obtain the optimal policies of supply chain members. In the following, we provide the specific solution process.…”

Section: Imentioning

confidence: 99%

Stackelberg pricing policy in dyadic capital-constrained supply chain considering bank's deposit and loan based on delay payment scheme

Cao¹,

Gong²,

You³

2021

JIMO

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In reality, supply chain member may apply for loan from bank when he\she is capital-constrained, or may deposit idle capital to bank when he\she is well-funded. This study focuses on the Stackelberg pricing policy considering bank's deposit and loan based on delay payment scheme in a dyadic capital-constrained supply chain. First, the market demand is given, and then the profit functions of supply chain members are built. According to Stackelberg game, the four pricing models are constructed for four scenarios. By solving models, optimal pricing policies of supply chain members for each scenario can be determined. Finally, impacts of the interest rate for fixed deposit by installments, deposit rate and loan rate on optimal pricing policies are analyzed. The research results show that, in manufacturer capital-constrained situation, these rates can affect optimal pricing policies and profits; in retailer capital-constrained situation, deposit rate and loan rate have no effect on them, but the interest rate for fixed deposit by installments can still affect them. Our study provides a feasible way for supply chain members in pricing decision considering bank's deposit and loan based on delay payment scheme in a dyadic capital-constrained supply chain, and contributes to the theoretical research on the capital-constrained supply chain management and the management practice for capital-constrained supply chain members with bank' deposit and loan.

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Section: Imentioning

confidence: 99%

Stackelberg pricing policy in dyadic capital-constrained supply chain considering bank's deposit and loan based on delay payment scheme

Cao¹,

Gong²,

You³

2021

JIMO

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“…Our work relates to the literature that studies supply chain models with bargaining processes. However, most of the existing works focuses on a two-echelon setting (see e.g., [10,24]). For more detailed reviews on two-echelon supply chain negotiations, please refer to reviews, [3,9,15,11].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Bargaining in a multi-echelon supply chain with power structure: KS solution vs. Nash solution

Zhong¹,

Xie²,

Shen³

2022

JIMO

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<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This paper studies a multi-echelon serial supply chain with negotiations over wholesale prices between successive echelons. Two types of bargaining systems with power structures are compared: one adopts the generalized Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution and the other adopts the generalized Nash solution. Our analyses show that, for any KS bargaining system with a given bargaining power structure, there is a Nash bargaining system with another bargaining power structure, such that the two systems are the same. However under the same power structure, the generalized KS solution results in lower wholesale price and higher total supply chain profit than the Nash solution does. Finally, we characterize the necessary and sufficient condition of the bargaining power structure under which the KS bargaining system Pareto dominates the Nash bargaining system, and the set characterized by such condition does not shrink to an empty set as the number of echelons increases to infinity.</p>

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“…Currently, supply chain financing mainly includes BCF and TCF. Many scholars pay attention to capital-constrained enterprises in a supply chain to mitigate the shortage of working capital through BCF or TCF [14,18,37]. Specifically, Chang and Rhee [4] discuss the supply chain coordination and optimal decision-making under TCF and price reduction subsidy provided by the supplier.…”

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confidence: 99%

Financing and ordering decisions in a capital-constrained and risk-averse supply chain for the monopolist and non-monopolist supplier

Zhen

Yang

Zhuo

2022

JIMO

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The paper focuses on a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one capital-constrained retailer. The retailer can solve the limited working capital problem through a bank, an investor, or its supplier. When facing business risks brought by uncertain demand, the retailer and the supplier are risk-averse behavior. To better explore the financing decision, we consider the supplier has two different cases: monopolist firm and non-monopolist firm. We first use the CVaR criterion to incorporate the members' risk-averse behavior into the objectives function. Then the equilibrium results of the supply chain are derived under three financing schemes, respectively. Our analysis finds when the supplier is a relatively low risk-averse monopolist firm, trade credit financing is the unique financing equilibrium. When the supplier is a relatively high risk-averse monopolist firm and non-monopolist firm, schemes, if the valuation level is relatively low, all members prefer bank credit financing. Otherwise, the members prefer equity financing. By tuning the valuation level, we obtain the conditions in which the supply chain realizes Pareto improvement relative to the other two financing schemes. Finally, we use numerical analysis to verify the above theoretical results.

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Bargaining equilibrium in a two-echelon supply chain with a capital-constrained retailer

Cited by 4 publications

References 55 publications

Stackelberg pricing policy in dyadic capital-constrained supply chain considering bank's deposit and loan based on delay payment scheme

Stackelberg pricing policy in dyadic capital-constrained supply chain considering bank's deposit and loan based on delay payment scheme

Bargaining in a multi-echelon supply chain with power structure: KS solution vs. Nash solution

Financing and ordering decisions in a capital-constrained and risk-averse supply chain for the monopolist and non-monopolist supplier

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