Bank Control, Owner Control, or Organizational Dynamics: Who Controls the Large Modern Corporation?

Fligstein, Neil; Brantley, Peter

doi:10.1086/230009

Cited by 199 publications

(132 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Results of these studies are mixed, see for example Bunting (1976), Pennings (1980), Burt (1983), Fligstein and Brantley (1992), and Phan et al (2003). Note that most research is based on US data.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interlocking Boards and Firm Performance: Evidence from a New Panel Database

Non

Franses

2007

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract An interlock between two firms occurs if the firms share one or more directors in their boards of directors. We explore the effect of interlocks on firm performance for 101 large Dutch firms using a large and new panel database. We use five different performance measures, and for each performance measure we design three different panel data models, where we allow the effect of the number of interlocks to be linear, quadratic or square root, either with or without lags. Terms of use: Documents inBased on all results we conclude that current interlocks can have a negative effect on future firm performance. We show that this negative effect is jointly established by (1) interlocking directors being too busy and (2) by directors being members of a homogenous upper class group.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interlocking Boards and Firm Performance: Evidence from a New Panel Database

Non

Franses

2007

SSRN Journal

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“…Podolny (1993) uses networks as a cause and consequence of the creation of a status hierarchy. Fligstein (1990) and Fligstein and Brantley (1992) argued that the social relations within and across firms and their more formal relations to the state are pivotal to understanding how stable markets emerge. Campbell and Lindberg (1990) and Campbell, Hollingsworth, and Lindberg (1991) These latter perspectives have been buttressed by studies on comparative industrial organization (Hamilton and Biggart 1988;Chandler 1990;Gerlach 1992) that show how state-firm interactions in various societies have produced unique cultures of production.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions

Fligstein¹

1996

American Sociological Review

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“…As a consequence, this development model brought a less developed capital market, and therefore a predominant role for banks when financing industrial activity. In the continental model, to guarantee banking finance can be an important function of the board of directors, which is why capital intensive companies will try to have bank representatives on their monitoring boards (Fligstein and Brantley 1992;Prowse 1994;Windolf and Beyer 1996). The structure of board of directors in these economies is explained by the theory of banking control.…”

Section: Boards Of Directors Interlocking Directorates and Cor-poratmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Spanish corporate structure through interlocking directorates

2016

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Abstract:The aim of this paper is to determine to what extent globalization pressures are changing interlocking directorate networks modeled on continental capitalism into Anglo-Saxon models. For this purpose we analyse the Spanish network of interlocks, comparing the present structure (2012) Palabras clave:Consejerías cruzadas, gobierno corporativo, estructura corporativa, España, control bancario.

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Bank Control, Owner Control, or Organizational Dynamics: Who Controls the Large Modern Corporation?

Cited by 199 publications

References 31 publications

Interlocking Boards and Firm Performance: Evidence from a New Panel Database

Interlocking Boards and Firm Performance: Evidence from a New Panel Database

Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions

The Spanish corporate structure through interlocking directorates

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