Bangladesh's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions and Challenges for Civil–Military Relations: A Case for Concordance Theory

Zaman, Rashed Uz; Biswas, Niloy Ranjan

doi:10.1080/13533312.2014.938913

Cited by 7 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…For example, when the government of Fiji, a major contributor given its small population, was threatened by military takeover in 2006, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan contacted the general in charge of the armed forces in Fiji, 'to say that, if the [military] illegally removes the government, the UN will withdraw Fiji troops from all UN peacekeeping operations'. 7 Similarly, as related by Zaman & Biswas (2014), during an unstable period in Bangladesh in 2007, the UN used its leverage to influence the strategic space available to the Bangladeshi military, forcing it to support a process that aspired to improve democratic governance. Beyond examples of such direct interventions, it is also likely that the UN's leverage is effectuated indirectly, without any explicit target, via the declaration of general principles in line with the preferences above (e.g.…”

Section: The Logic Of Peacekeeping Dependency Constraintsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The reimbursements they receive from the UN typically exceed their costs (Gaibulloev et al, 2015). 3 In a given TCC, the beneficiaries of economic benefits may include the national government, military institutions, individual militaries, and private firms (Bellamy & Williams, 2013), but in a typical case, the military is the main beneficiary (Levin et al, 2016; Zaman & Biswas, 2014).…”

Section: The Logic Of Peacekeeping Dependency Constraintsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…What are the consequences for the political stability of contributing states? Oddly neglected in conventional peacekeeping research, these questions are at the center of an emergent literature on participation effects (Sotomayor, 2013; Levin et al, 2016; Savage & Caverley, 2014; Zaman & Biswas, 2014; Dwyer, 2015). In this literature, there is consensus that peacekeeping service abroad affects civil–military relations at home, but the nature and direction of the effect remains in dispute: claims that participation reduces military insubordination stand against claims that it contributes to instability or illiberal entrenchment.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 6 US Embassy Dhaka ‘USG rejects request for support for possible coup’, 24 September 2004 (https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04DHAKA3164_a.html). See also Zaman & Biswas (2014). …”

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confidence: 99%

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Backdoor peacekeeping

Lundgren

2018

Journal of Peace Research

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I advance and test a theoretical argument of how participation in UN peacekeeping affects the likelihood of coup attempts in troop-contributing countries (TCCs). The argument highlights the interplay between the economic incentives of militaries in poor TCCs and the UN’s preference for contributors with stable civil–military relations. Fearing the loss of UN reimbursement funds, militaries for which such funds are important will avoid visible acts of military insubordination, such as coup attempts, that would place their future participation in UN peacekeeping at risk. I test this proposition against time-series cross-sectional data on 157 countries in the 1991–2013 period using panel regression and matching. The data show that countries where the armed forces are more dependent on peacekeeping revenues experience fewer coup attempts than comparable peers, even when taking coup-proofing measures and other alternative explanations into account. I also find that the coup-restraining effect is only observed in periods where member states contribute enough troops to award the UN a real choice over alternative contributors. The study introduces a novel theoretic logic, presents empirical results at odds with the existing literature, and suggests important policy implications with regard to UN vetting and standards for troop-contributing countries.

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Section: The Logic Of Peacekeeping Dependency Constraintsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Logic Of Peacekeeping Dependency Constraintsmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 6 US Embassy Dhaka ‘USG rejects request for support for possible coup’, 24 September 2004 (https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04DHAKA3164_a.html). See also Zaman & Biswas (2014). …”

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confidence: 99%

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Backdoor peacekeeping

Lundgren

2018

Journal of Peace Research

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“…Kant claims that one of the objectives of international organizations such as the UN is to democratize single party countries. Peacekeeping operations are also argued to have positive impact in improving civil-military relations in developing states, for example in Bangladesh (Zaman & Biswas, 2014).…”

Section: Why Is Uno Considered To Be An Effective Organization?:-mentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating the Effectiveness of the United Nations Organizations: The Limits of Theories and Need for a ‘New Analytical Framework’.

Minar¹

2018

IJAR

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Global Justice Index Report 2020

Qin

Wang

et al. 2021

Chin. Polit. Sci. Rev.

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The Global Justice Index is a multiyear research project conducted at the Fudan-IAS to conceptualize and measure each country’s contribution to achieving greater global justice. In 2019, we completed our research project on first-year achievements, with the rankings of nation-states at the global level based on data from 2010 to 2017. This was published titled the “Global Justice Index Report” in Chinese Political Science Review (Vol. 5, No. 3, 2020). The “Global Justice Index Report 2020” is the second annual report based on our work analyzing data from 2010 to 2018, which was concluded in 2020. In order to better measure each country’s performance and contribution to achieving greater global justice, compared to the first edition published in 2020, we have improved the model, added the refugee issue to expand the issue areas to 10, and added new indicators, regional analysis and comparison in this report. The report comprises five main sections. In the introduction, we discuss the development of the conceptual framework and evaluative principles to justify our selection of dimensions and indicators for measurement. Next, in the section of methodology, we discuss the production, normalization, and aggregation of the raw data and the generation of the final results. In the findings section, we report the data, indicators and our results for the ten issues, and provide regional comparisons. And then, in the following section we present the main results, and report the ranking of each country’s contribution to achieving greater global justice. In the final section, we discuss the applications and limitations of the index, and its potential further research trajectories.

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Bangladesh's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions and Challenges for Civil–Military Relations: A Case for Concordance Theory

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Backdoor peacekeeping

Backdoor peacekeeping

Evaluating the Effectiveness of the United Nations Organizations: The Limits of Theories and Need for a ‘New Analytical Framework’.

Global Justice Index Report 2020

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