Balancing Competing Demands: Position Taking and Election Proximity in the European Parliament

Abstract

Parties value unity, yet members of parliament have incentives to deviate from the party line. This article examines how members of the European Parliament (EP) respond to competing demands from national parties and European party groups. We examine ideological shifts within a single parliamentary term to assess how election proximity affects party group cohesion. Our formal model of legislative behavior suggests that when EP elections are proximate, national party delegations shift toward national party positions, thus weakening EP party group cohesion. Our Bayesian item‐response analysis of roll calls in the 5th EP supports our theoretical predictions.

Multiple Principals and Legislative Cohesion

“…In terms of EU‐specific implications, recent events increasing the average electoral volatility of the EP, in particular the accession of more volatile eastern European countries and the success of far‐right and far‐left parties, should lead national parties to tighten their grip on their MEPs, depriving European groups of their influence. Our conclusions are consistent with other researchers seeking the contextual, often domestic, determinants of MEP discipline (Faas ; Farrell and Scully ; Hix ; Klüver and Spoon ; Lindstädt, Slapin, and Vander Wielen ). In addition, our results further strengthen the argument that MEPs are collectively accountable to national parties but not necessarily individually accountable to voters (Hix and Høyland ).…”

“…We identify the role of electoral uncertainty for the dominant principal as a modulating factor in determining the behavior of legislators. In this way, our argument shares a viewpoint with previous work by Lindstädt, Slapin, and Vander Wielen () exploring election proximity as a contextual determinant of cohesion. While many of the baseline elements of a principal‐agent relationship, such as institutional powers, will be persistent, any condition that creates uncertainty for the dominant principal can lead it to reassert its control over its agent.…”

Party Strategies, Constituency Links, and Legislative Speech

“…This tension between establishing party loyalty and allowing for some dissent exists in democracies across Latin America (Carey ), as well as in the United States (e.g., Cox and McCubbins ; Lindstadt and Vander Wielen ), Europe (e.g., Hix ; Lindstädt, Slapin, and Vander Wielen ; Proksch and Slapin ), and elsewhere (Kam ). However, the nature and extent of the tension between partisan control and legislator freedom varies with electoral incentives and institutions (e.g., Carey and Shugart ; Chang and Golden ).…”

Dynamic Partisanship: Party Loyalty and Agenda Setting in the U.S. House

“…In particular, the need for parties to balance collective goals with electoral interests is relevant, for example, for parties in the European Parliament (Lindstädt, Slapin and Vander Wielen, 2011), as well as for parties in other democratic systems (Carey, 2007(Carey, , 2008.…”