Multiple Principals and Legislative Cohesion

Abstract

In many systems, legislators find themselves accountable to multiple principals. This article seeks to further answer how legislators decide between their principals and what factors condition legislators to choose one over the other. We argue that electoral uncertainty, operationalized as electoral volatility, pushes legislators towards the principal that has the greatest influence over their re-election. Using European Parliament electoral results and roll-call data from the second to the sixth European Parliaments , we show that increases in electoral volatility decreased European group cohesion and pushed legislators to side more with the positions of their national parties over their European group when the two disagreed.

When politics prevails: Parties, elections and loyalty in the European Parliament

“…Meserve et al. () show that electoral volatility in EP elections – at member state level, between 1984 and 2009 – increased MEPs’ attention to the domestic arena, strengthened the dominance of the national party principal and, accordingly, drove up individual defection.…”

“…: 39; 41–47; Meserve et al. : 10). National media rarely scrutinise EU lawmaking, but the defection of a delegation from its domestic base makes ‘headlines’ – especially before an election (Lindstädt et al.…”

“…: 44–45; Meserve et al. : 10). A similar mechanism has been identified in political parties divided on the issue of Europe: before an election, when vote‐seeking becomes the dominant motivation and inconsistent messaging a risk to success, the leadership suppresses intraparty conflict more effectively (Hellström & Blomgren : 268, 269, 279).…”

“…) and on MEPs’ defection (Meserve et al. ). Recent studies also demonstrate that national parties’ issue salience impacts on MEPs’ voting behaviour (Klüver & Spoon ; Costello & Thomson ).…”

Liberty: Security dilemmas and party cohesion in the European Parliament

“…As a consequence, voting dissent is most likely to occur when there is a divergence in the preferences of the two principals of the MEP: the EPG and the national party (Hix, ). Thus, it is not surprising that previous studies (Faas, ; Hix, , ; Lindstädt et al, ; Meserve et al ., ) have shown that policy conflict between the national party and the EPG is a major predictor of MEP defection at roll‐call votes. These studies have measured policy conflict using the distances between the two principals of the MEP on the left–right scale and on the EU integration dimension.…”