Backing into Spinozism

Abstract

One vexing strand of Spinozism asserts that God's nature is more expansive than traditionally conceived and includes properties like being extended. In this paper, I argue that prominent early moderns embrace metaphysical principles about causation, mental representation, and modality that pressure their advocates towards such an expansive account of God's nature in similar ways. I further argue that the main early modern escape route, captured in notions like “eminent containment,” fails to adequately relieve the metaphysical pressures towards Spinozism. The upshot is that those sympathetic with these early modern projects must embrace a costlier option if they are to successfully escape the orbit of Spinoza.

The Contours of Locke’s General Substance Dualism

“…Locke may have room to maneuver here, but this is not my concern. SeeNewlands (2016) for further discussion of this sort of pressure more generally. Note also that much more needs to be said on which sorts of kind terms are relevant here, as Locke would deny, for instance, that our weakness implies God's weakness.16 I submit that it is because of PSR-based reasoning like this that Locke asserts 'that where the Faculties, or outward Frame so much differs, the internal Constitution is not exactly the same' (III.vi.22), granting what I argue in section 4 that internal constitutions are real essences, which in turn are substrata.…”