2015
DOI: 10.1111/jori.12097
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BETWEEN‐GROUP ADVERSE SELECTION: EVIDENCE FROM GROUP CRITICAL ILLNESS INSURANCE

Abstract: This article demonstrates the presence of adverse selection in the group insurance market. Conventional wisdom suggests that group insurance mitigates adverse selection because it minimizes individual choice. We complement this conventional wisdom by analyzing a group insurance scenario in which individual choice is excluded, and we find that group insurance alone is not effective enough to eliminate adverse selection; that is, between‐group adverse selection exists. Between‐group adverse selection, however, d… Show more

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Cited by 14 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…As argued in the literature, CSR can be used to act as “insurance” for firm reputation protection and crisis management (Minor & Morgan, 2011; Shiu & Yang, 2017; Werther & Chandler, 2005). Given that adverse selection and moral hazard are widespread in insurance markets (Eling et al., 2017; Soika, 2018), a similar problem may also exist for firms in CSR engagement vis‐à‐vis CSR being considered as a protective measure. To gain the trust of stakeholders, firms with severe agency problems may carry out responsible activities and pretend to be a “good citizen”, and expect those activities to ultimately reduce the value loss in the future (adverse selection).…”
Section: The Prior Literature and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As argued in the literature, CSR can be used to act as “insurance” for firm reputation protection and crisis management (Minor & Morgan, 2011; Shiu & Yang, 2017; Werther & Chandler, 2005). Given that adverse selection and moral hazard are widespread in insurance markets (Eling et al., 2017; Soika, 2018), a similar problem may also exist for firms in CSR engagement vis‐à‐vis CSR being considered as a protective measure. To gain the trust of stakeholders, firms with severe agency problems may carry out responsible activities and pretend to be a “good citizen”, and expect those activities to ultimately reduce the value loss in the future (adverse selection).…”
Section: The Prior Literature and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A few studies have investigated sick leave policies in Asian countries (e.g., Earle & Heymann, 2006; Eling, Jia, & Yao, 2015). However, most of them did not thoroughly analyze the effects of the policies on labor behaviors.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, if employees are insulated from plan costs because the premiums are heavily subsidized by the employer, they may choose more generous plans which may lead to adverse selection in the group market (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000). If individual choice is excluded altogether from a group insurance scenario, then group insurance may still experience the presence of adverse selection (Eling, Jia, and Yao, 2017). 4 , 5 While insurers writing business in the large group market post‐ACA are permitted to use experience rating, health insurers writing business in the individual and small group markets are restricted to the use of adjusted community rating, thus reducing their ability to charge rates based on risk classification.…”
Section: Background and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Eling, Jia, and Yao (2017) study between‐group adverse selection in group critical illness insurance and find that if group insurance is renewed over time with the same insurer, the information learned from experience rating mitigates the effects of the presence of adverse selection in the group market.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%