Axioms and postulates: Finding the right match through logical inference

Negro, Niccolò

doi:10.1017/s0140525x2100193x

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 8 publications

(6 reference statements)

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“…Or perhaps they assume that everyone should realize that IIT's five axioms are self-evident and their translation into postulates unique. But, as already indicated by previous criticisms of the IIT axioms (32)(33)(34)(35), it would be desirable to argue for their presumed status as self-evident truths and make more explicit the reasoning behind turning them into postulates (36,37). Reference to introspection and reasoning alone seems a superficial means for a "phenomenology-first" approach if not accompanied by a truly phenomenological method (but see (27)).…”

Section: The Primacy and Structure Of Experiencementioning

confidence: 97%

We need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic

Signorelli¹,

Cea²,

Prentner³

2022

Preprint

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Models of consciousness need to explain both objective correlates of conscious experience as well as its subjective structure. However, such an explanation would not need to entail a reduction exclusively in terms of physical or neural systems. We briefly sketch a few points of contention with recent work on integrated information theory and some common assumptions made in the neuroscience of consciousness more generally.

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Section: The Primacy and Structure Of Experiencementioning

confidence: 97%

We need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic

Signorelli¹,

Cea²,

Prentner³

2022

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Although previous versions of IIT did not explicitly clarify the logic of this translation (for discussions on this point, see [16][17][18][19]), IIT 4.0 explains that the postulates are inferred via an "inference to a good explanation" from the axioms and a triad of basic assumptions [11,12]. These assumptions are realism, operational physicalism, and atomism.…”

Section: Iit Basicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Fundamental Tension in Integrated Information Theory 4.0’s Realist Idealism

Cea,

Negro,

Signorelli

2023

Entropy

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Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is currently one of the most influential scientific theories of consciousness. Here, we focus specifically on a metaphysical aspect of the theory’s most recent version (IIT 4.0), what we may call its idealistic ontology, and its tension with a kind of realism about the external world that IIT also endorses. IIT 4.0 openly rejects the mainstream view that consciousness is generated by the brain, positing instead that consciousness is ontologically primary while the physical domain is just “operational”. However, this philosophical position is presently underdeveloped and is not rigorously formulated in IIT, potentially leading to many misinterpretations and undermining its overall explanatory power. In the present paper we aim to address this issue. We argue that IIT’s idealistic ontology should be understood as a specific combination of phenomenal primitivism, reductionism regarding Φ-structures and complexes, and eliminativism about non-conscious physical entities. Having clarified this, we then focus on the problematic tension between IIT’s idealistic ontology and its simultaneous endorsement of realism, according to which there is some kind of external reality independent of our minds. After refuting three potential solutions to this theoretical tension, we propose the most plausible alternative: understanding IIT’s realism as an assertion of the existence of other experiences beyond one’s own, what we call a non-solipsistic idealist realism. We end with concluding remarks and future research avenues.

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“…postulates), and naturally much criticism of IIT has been directed at exactly the question of whether or not IIT is falsifiable (see target articles and replies in [24][25][26]) or whether or not its axiomatic basis is really that "axiomatic" in the classical sense (namely, self-evidently true [27,28]). In the latest iteration of the theory, the central identity has been replaced by an "explanatory identity" [29][30][31][32][33] that supposedly carries less ontological weight.…”

Section: The Central Identity Revisitedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Applying category theory to the study of consciousness?

Prentner¹

2022

Preprint

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What are the potential uses and misuses of applying category theory to the study of consciousness? We first review a recent proposal from the neurosciences of consciousness to illustrate the general approach using the integrated information theory of consciousness. We then propose possible avenues for further research, importantly also stressing the need to better develop the categorical representation of consciousness, in particular its phenomenological structure. A better understanding of consciousness cannot be achieved by merely studying the physical brain. By contrast, the categorical treatment suggests application in the domain of computer science and artificial intelligence research while also emphasizing the primacy of (first-personal) experience.

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Axioms and postulates: Finding the right match through logical inference

Cited by 5 publications

References 8 publications

We need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic

We need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic

The Fundamental Tension in Integrated Information Theory 4.0’s Realist Idealism

Applying category theory to the study of consciousness?

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