Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem

A Strategic Implementation of the Shapley Value for the Nested Cost‐Sharing Problem

“…The strategy that each agent announces his own demand or contribution has been considered by many authors such as Winter (), Dasgupta and Chiu (), and Hu et al . (). Of course, each agent has an incentive to contribute as little as possible in the cost‐sharing problems.…”

“…Strategic implementations of other rules such as the “nucleolus” and the “modified nucleolus” in the nested cost‐sharing problem can be found in Hu, Tsay, and Yeh (, ).…”

The Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update

“…Each rejector j negotiates her contribution with agent n by invoking the standard rule to solve the negotiation between herself and agent n. The authors show that their game has a unique Nash equilibrium outcome, which is, moreover, the nucleolus contributions vector. Hu et al (2012) considers a 3-stage sequential game in which the agent with the largest need is the responder, and all the other agents are proposers. These authors show that for each such problem, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of that game and it coincides with the nucleolus.…”

A new analysis of a simple model of fair allocation

“…Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, 2006 Moulin and Shenker, 1992). Similarly, the constrained equal benefits rule (which corresponds to the constrained equal losses rule) is the only rule satisfying equal treatment of equals, a limited version of the independence property mentioned above, and a specific version of the consistency principle (e.g., Hu et al, 2012). http://www.upo.es/econ Formally, T (N, c, E) = (min{ 1 2 c i , λ}) i∈N if E ≤ 1 2 C and (max{ 1 2 c i , c i − µ}) i∈N if E ≥ 1 2 C, where λ and µ are chosen so that the balance condition is guaranteed.…”