Scarf (1960) proposed a market environment and a model of dynamic adjustment in .which the standard tatonnement price adjustment process orbits around, rather than converges to, the competitive equilibrium. Hirota ( 1981) characterized the price paths by the configuration of endowments. We explore the predictions of Scarf's model in a non tatonnement experimental double auction. We find that the average transaction prices in each period do follow the path predicted by the Scarf and Hirota models. vVhen the model predicts prices will converge to the competitive equilibrium, our data converge; when the model predicts prices will orbit. our data orbit the equilibrium, and in the direction predicted by the model. Moreover. we observe a weak tendency for prices within a period to follow the path predicted by the model.

Armchair evidence shows that many industries are made of a few big commercial or manufacturing firms, which are able to affect the market outcome, and of a myriad of small family-run businesses with very few employees, each of which has a negligible impact on the market. Examples can be found in apparel, catering, publishers and bookstores, retailing, finance and insurances, and IT industries. We provide a new general equilibrium framework that encapsulates both market structures. Due to the higher toughness of the market, the entry of big firms leads them to sell more through a market expansion effect, which is generated by the exit of small firms. Furthermore, the level of social welfare increases with the number of oligopolistic firms because the procompetitive effect associated with the entry of a big firm dominates the resulting decrease in product variety.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. AbstractWe extend Nash's bargaining theory to non-convex and coalitional problems. This paper investigates the implications of Nash-like axioms for bilateral problems and the properties of consistency and converse consistency over multilateral settings. The result is a characterization of the Nash set of NTU games, defined as the solution concept where each pair of players is splitting the gains from trade at a point where the Nash product of their utilities, subject to efficiency, is critical. The intersection of the Nash set and the core is also characterized with the same axioms for the class of games where the core is non-empty. Journal of Economic Literature classification numbers: C71, C78.2

We study a general class of pure exchange economies that have multiple equilibria. This class generalizes an example presented by Shapley and Shubik. For such economies, we find easily verified conditions that determine whether there are multiple equilibria. We also provide simple methods for constructing economies in which arbitrary pre-specified sets of prices are equilibria. These economies have strong comparative statics properties, since prices at interior competitive equilibrium depend on the parameters of utility but not on the endowment quantities. We believe that this easily manipulated special case is a valuable addition to the class of simple general equilibrium economies that can be used as testing grounds in economic theory.

Abstract:We propose a nonempty-valued subsolution of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set on the class of TU games satisfying grand coalition zero-monotonicity, a weaker condition than superadditivity, zero-monotouicity and balaneedness. The subsolution is a slight modification of the Shapley-Shubik Quasi-Core. The Zhou Bargaining Set is a refinement of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set. We also give a nonempty-valued subsolution of the Zhou Bargaining Set on the class of all TU games satisfying grand coalition superadditivity, a weaker condition than superadditivity and ba|ancedness. This subsolution is a modification of the Zhou Bargaining Set which is described by excesses. These results are examined for TU games with coalition structurcs.