Autonomy and the Paradox of Self-Creation: Infinite Regresses, Finite Selves, and the Limits of Authenticity

Noggle, Robert A

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511614194.004

Cited by 48 publications

(23 citation statements)

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“…It is quite common in philosophy to think about a person’s individual identity in terms of a core-periphery model, the core-periphery distinction being introduced to indicate that not all psychic elements are of equal importance to the person ([31], 99–100; [32], 153–154; [33, 34], 27–28). To say that psychic element E is ‘located’ closer to the core than another element F means that E is more important for and more distinctive of the person than F:

“[The] core attitudes … determine what [a person’s] life is all about and what is important to her; they give shape and contour to her way of looking at, and being in, the world.

…”

Section: Individual Identitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Deep Brain Stimulation and the Search for Identity

et al. 2011

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Ethical evaluation of deep brain stimulation as a treatment for Parkinson’s disease is complicated by results that can be described as involving changes in the patient’s identity. The risk of becoming another person following surgery is alarming for patients, caregivers and clinicians alike. It is one of the most urgent conceptual and ethical problems facing deep brain stimulation in Parkinson’s disease at this time. In our paper we take issue with this problem on two accounts. First, we elucidate what is meant by “becoming another person” from a conceptual point of view. After critically discussing two broad approaches we concentrate on the notion of “individual identity” which centers on the idea of “core attitudes”. Subsequently we discuss several approaches to determine what distinguishes core attitudes from those that are more peripheral. We argue for a “foundational-function model” highlighting the importance of specific dependency relations between these attitudes. Our second aim is to comment on the possibility to empirically measure changes in individual identity and argue that many of the instruments now commonly used in selecting and monitoring DBS-patients are inappropriate for this purpose. Future research in this area is advised combining a conceptual and an empirical approach as a basis of sound ethical appraisal.

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“[The] core attitudes … determine what [a person’s] life is all about and what is important to her; they give shape and contour to her way of looking at, and being in, the world.

…”

Section: Individual Identitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Deep Brain Stimulation and the Search for Identity

et al. 2011

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“…The philosophical discussion of autonomy posits that each person has some set of pro-attitudesreferred to variously as their "motivational set" [7], "collection of values" [3], "conception of the good" [13], "psychological core" [14], or "worldview" -and that the possession of this set underlies his or her autonomy in several ways, two of which have been discussed heavily in the literature. First, there are hierarchical internalist considerations concerning whether there is identification, at time t, between one's pro-attitudes and those first-order desires that are directed towards action [1,2].…”

Section: Philosophical Perspective: the Role Of Experience-responsivementioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, Arneson writes that: "To live an autonomous life an agent must decide on a plan of life through critical reflection and in the process of carrying it out, remain disposed to subject the plan to critical review if […] unanticipated evidence indicates the need for such review" [19]. Similarly, Noggle contends that, in addition to "a skeleton of core attitudes, the fully formed [and autonomous] self has the ability to adjust and revise its own attitudes" [14]. In addition, others have discussed the role of reasonsresponsiveness in autonomous agency [e.g., 20], and it seems plausible to think that experienceresponsiveness might be understood as a particular way of responding to reasons, specifically, responding to reasons-to-review and/or reasons-to-revise a pro-attitude that one currently holds.…”

Section: Philosophical Perspective: the Role Of Experience-responsivementioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, even though Weimer suggests that the experience-responsiveness condition "allows for an agent to be on 'autopilot' with respect to her motivational states for long periods of time, merely monitoring in a passive way for unanticipated evidence", he holds that pro-attitude incorporation requires that she is able to "retake active control of the relevant part(s) of her life by rationally reconsidering" the appropriate pro-attitude(s) [7] (emphasis added). In addition, Noggle maintains that pro-attitude incorporation requires "the psychological mechanisms necessary to allow [the agent] to reflect upon and revise those beliefs and desires" -a process he calls "reflective self-adjustment" [14] (emphasis added).…”

Section: Synthesis Of Perspectives From Philosophy and Neurosciencementioning

confidence: 99%

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Updating our Selves: Synthesizing Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Incorporating New Information into our Worldview

2015

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Given the ubiquity and centrality of social and relational influences to the human experience, our conception of self-governance must adequately account for these external influences. The inclusion of socio-historical, externalist (i.e., "relational") considerations into more traditional internalist (i.e., "individualist") accounts of autonomy has been an important feature of the debate over personal autonomy in recent years. But the relevant socio-temporal dynamics of autonomy are not only historical in nature. There are also important, and under-examined, futureoriented questions about how we retain autonomy while incorporating new values into the existing set that guides our interaction with the world. In this paper, we examine these questions from two complementary perspectives: philosophy and neuroscience. After contextualizing the philosophical debate, we show the importance to theories of autonomous agency of the capacity to appropriately adapt our values and beliefs, in light of relevant experiences and evidence, to changing circumstances. We present a plausible philosophical account of this process, which we claim is generally applicable to theories about the nature of autonomy, both internalist and externalist alike. We then evaluate this account by providing a model for how the incorporation of values might occur in the brain; one that is inspired by recent theoretical and empirical advances in our understanding of the neural processes by which our beliefs are updated by new information. Finally, we synthesize these two perspectives and discuss how the neurobiology might inform the philosophical discussion.

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“…And this, in turn, helps to explain the fascination that some have had for the idea of self-creation. This idea, which at the very least necessitates some fairly heavy-duty metaphysics and is even then probably incoherent, has been rightly criticized by many theorists [Dworkin 1976: 24;Taylor 1982;Feinberg 1989: 33-5;Noggle 2005;Oshana 2006: 155;Taylor 2009: 97-102]. Indeed it is clearly delusional to think that anyone could create themselves in this way, let alone that this could be a universal condition of human beings-a delusion sustainable only in the context of a 7 Note also that, whereas part of the job of an account of local autonomy is to explain the normative authority of choices typically made by competent adults, there is no similar reason why levels of global autonomy cannot be ascribed to animals and infants.…”

Section: Pathologies Of Autonomymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Autonomous Life: A Pure Social View

Garnett

2013

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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In this paper I propose and develop a social account of global autonomy. On this view, a person is autonomous simply to the extent to which it is difficult for others to subject her to their wills. I argue that many properties commonly thought necessary for autonomy are in fact properties that tend to increase an agent's immunity to such interpersonal subjection, and that the proposed account is therefore capable of providing theoretical unity to many of the otherwise heterogeneous requirements of autonomy familiar from recent discussions. Specifically, I discuss three such requirements: (i) possession of legally protected status, (ii) a sense of one's own self-worth, and (iii) a capacity for critical reflection. I argue that the proposed account is not only theoretically satisfying but also yields a rich and attractive conception of autonomy.

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Autonomy and the Paradox of Self-Creation: Infinite Regresses, Finite Selves, and the Limits of Authenticity

Cited by 48 publications

References 0 publications

Deep Brain Stimulation and the Search for Identity

Deep Brain Stimulation and the Search for Identity

Updating our Selves: Synthesizing Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Incorporating New Information into our Worldview

The Autonomous Life: A Pure Social View

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