The Autonomous Life: A Pure Social View

Abstract

In this paper I propose and develop a social account of global autonomy. On this view, a person is autonomous simply to the extent to which it is difficult for others to subject her to their wills. I argue that many properties commonly thought necessary for autonomy are in fact properties that tend to increase an agent's immunity to such interpersonal subjection, and that the proposed account is therefore capable of providing theoretical unity to many of the otherwise heterogeneous requirements of autonomy familiar from recent discussions. Specifically, I discuss three such requirements: (i) possession of legally protected status, (ii) a sense of one's own self-worth, and (iii) a capacity for critical reflection. I argue that the proposed account is not only theoretically satisfying but also yields a rich and attractive conception of autonomy.

Ageism and Autonomy in Health Care: Explorations Through a Relational Lens

“…The assumption in this paper is that autonomy itself is an important concept because of the values it embodies, but the procedural account is unduly atomistic, and a relational model should be understood as the more appropriate conceptualization. 16 See, for example: [36,64,83]. 17 This idea in particular has been used in different contexts by different authors.…”

Agency and Inner Freedom

“…This is surprising: in addition to overturning a widespread assumption of much contemporary work on agency and personal autonomy, this result also challenges what is, on at least one interpretation of the tradition, the doctrine at the heart of ‘positive’ approaches to political freedom, namely the idea that to be truly free one must be able to give expression to one's true self (C. Taylor ). Yet while this severing of the theory of freedom from the theory of agency may seem radical when presented starkly, it is in fact consonant with a more recent turning away, on the part of some autonomy theorists (Arpaly ; Garnett ; Mele ; J. S. Taylor ), from those questions about identification and alienation that so animated philosophers in previous decades. If successful, this paper provides a deep vindication of this new emerging theoretical orientation.…”

Freedom and Unpredictability

“…Elsewhere I have argued in detail that possession of legally protected status, a capacity for critical reflection, and a healthy sense of one's own self-worth are all significant conferrers of resistance to interpersonal subjection, and hence of social freedom in its broadly republican sense (Garnett 2013). Now I wish to suggest that epistemic unpredictability is, in the same way, an important conferrer of such resistance.…”