Automatic cueing of covert spatial attention by a novel agent in preschoolers and adults

Terrizzi, Brandon Frank; Beier, Jonathan S.

doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2016.08.001

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…As in Samson et al (2010), the stimuli consisted of a picture showing a lateral view into a room with the left, back, and right walls visible; on test trials, zero, one, or two red dots were displayed in either one or two walls. During the familiarisation phase, participants saw images of a novel entity (based on the novel entity in Terrizzi & Beier, 2016) positioned in the centre of the room, with text representing the speech of the entity appearing above the room against the grey background.…”

Section: Apparatus and Stimulimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the four experiments reported here, we implemented a novel version of the dot-perspective task that replaced the central figure with an unfamiliar object modelled after the stimuli from Terrizzi and Beier (2016). To minimise the risk that participants would spontaneously imbue this central figure with perspectival agency, we ensured that it lacked any characteristically agentic features.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Of particular relevance to the mentalising-submentalising debate surrounding the dot-perspective task, construing a novel object as an agent also influences more low-level, automatic processes. Terrizzi and Beier (2016) investigated the influence of agency construal on children's and adults' covert attentional responses within a gaze-cueing paradigm (Posner, 1980;Terrizzi & Beier, 2016). They found that participants fixated more quickly on laterally presented targets that appeared in locations congruent with the prior orientation of a novel object-but only when that object had previously behaved in a socially contingent manner indicative of its agency.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Beyond avatars and arrows: Testing the mentalising and submentalising hypotheses with a novel entity paradigm

Westra

Terrizzi

Baal

et al. 2021

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

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In recent years, there has been a heated debate about how to interpret findings that seem to show that humans rapidly and automatically calculate the visual perspectives of others. In the current study, we investigated the question of whether automatic interference effects found in the dot-perspective task (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010) are the product of domain-specific perspective-taking processes or of domain-general “submentalizing” processes (Heyes, 2014). Previous attempts to address this question have done so by implementing inanimate controls, such as arrows, as stimuli. The rationale for this is that submentalizing processes that respond to directionality should be engaged by such stimuli, whereas domain-specific perspective-taking mechanisms, if they exist, should not. These previous attempts have been limited, however, by the implied intentionality of the stimuli they have used (e.g. arrows), which may have invited participants to imbue them with perspectival agency. Drawing inspiration from “novel entity” paradigms from infant gaze-following research, we designed a version of the dot-perspective task that allowed us to precisely control whether a central stimulus was viewed as animate or inanimate. Across four experiments, we found no evidence that automatic “perspective-taking” effects in the dot-perspective task are modulated by beliefs about the animacy of the central stimulus. Our results also suggest that these effects may be due to the task-switching elements of the dot-perspective paradigm, rather than automatic directional orienting. Together, these results indicate that neither the perspective-taking nor the standard submentalizing interpretations of the dot-perspective task are fully correct.

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Section: Apparatus and Stimulimentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Beyond avatars and arrows: Testing the mentalising and submentalising hypotheses with a novel entity paradigm

Westra

Terrizzi

Baal

et al. 2021

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

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show abstract

“…So a mindreading‐based explanation of the finding is equally possible, as Heyes herself notes (p. 267–268). Moreover, in a related paradigm, Terrizzi and Beier () have shown that “automatic” attention orienting is influenced by whether one believes (tacitly) that the target figure is an agent or not. If the figure interacts contingently with another agent prior to the orienting trials, attention‐shifts result; whereas if the figure goes through exactly the same sequence of movements and sounds, but not while interacting contingently with another agent, it does not.…”

Section: Mindreadingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognitive instincts versus cognitive gadgets: A fallacy

Roige

Carruthers

2019

Mind & Language

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The main thesis of Heyes' book is that all of the domain‐specific learning mechanisms that make the human mind so different from the minds of other animals are culturally created and culturally acquired gadgets. The only innate differences are some motivational tweaks, enhanced capacities for associative learning, and enhanced executive function abilities. But Heyes' argument depends on contrasting cognitive gadgets with cognitive instincts, which are said to be innately specified. This ignores what has for some years been the mainstream nativist/anti‐empiricist view, which commits only to partially specified learning systems that become elaborated and built through domain‐specific learning.

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“…Bayliss, Schuch & Tipper, 2010but see: Hietanen & Leppanen, 2003 -;Deaner, Shepherd, & Platt, 2007;Gobel, Tufft, & Richardson, 2017;Gregory & Jackson, 2019;Marotta, Lupiáñez, Martella, & Casagrande, 2012;Pavan, Dalmaso, Castelli, & Galfano, 2011). The literature suggests that gaze cuing is more likely to occur when the gazer has the necessary means to hold mental states (is intentional, Wiese, Wykowska, Zwickel, & Müller, 2012;Gobel et al, 2017;Terrizzi & Beier, 2016) and when the gaze cue is interpreted as part of an intentional gaze-shift (Hietanen, 2002). Although when two masks are worn by the same individual on front and back of the head, the gaze cuing effect fails to emerge even though participants can verbally report which of the two mask directions hid intentionality (Kingstone, Kachkovski, Vasilyev, Kuk, & Welsh, 2019).…”

Section: Intentions and Gaze Direction As Indicators Of Attentionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Attention in naïve psychology

Elekes¹,

Király²

2019

Preprint

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In everyday life, the process of mentalizing is nested in a rich context of cognitive faculties and background information that potentially contribute to its success. Yet, we know little about these modulating effects. Here we propose that humans develop a naïve psychological model of attention (featured as a goal-dependent, intentional relation to the environment) and use this to fine-tune their mentalizing attempts, presuming that the way people represent their environment is influenced by the cognitive priorities (attention) their current intentions create. The attention model provides an opportunity to tailor mental state inferences to the temporary features of the agent whose mind is in the focus of mentalizing. The ability to trace attention is an exceptionally powerful aid for mindreading. Knowledge about the partner’s attention provides background information, however being grounded in his current intentions, attention has direct relevance to the ongoing interaction. Furthermore, due to its causal connection to intentions, the output of the attention model remains valid for a prolonged but predictable amount of time: till the evoking intention is in place. The naïve attention model theory is offered as a novel theory on social attention that both incorporates existing evidence and identifies new directions in research.

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Automatic cueing of covert spatial attention by a novel agent in preschoolers and adults

Cited by 5 publications

References 51 publications

Beyond avatars and arrows: Testing the mentalising and submentalising hypotheses with a novel entity paradigm

Beyond avatars and arrows: Testing the mentalising and submentalising hypotheses with a novel entity paradigm

Cognitive instincts versus cognitive gadgets: A fallacy

Attention in naïve psychology

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