Autism in Translation 2018
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-93293-4_7
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Autism and First-Person Accounts: The Cognitive Problem

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“…In large part the result of the writings of autistic individuals, many of them activists (see, e.g., the works of Temple Grandin and Donna Williams), scholars are chipping away at the assumptions of deficit by identifying rationality, coherence, logic, creativity, and metaphor where these were assumed to be absent (Costa and Grinker 2018;Draaisma 2009;Savarese 2018). Following Biklen (2005), Hacking (2009), and others (see Osteen 2008), Costa and Grinker (2018), for example, draw on phenomenology and philosophy of mind in an analysis of firstperson accounts of autism by Sean Barron (Barron and Barron 2002), Lucy Blackman (Blackman 2001), Carly Fleischmann (Fleischmann 2012), Naoki Higashida (Higashida 2013), Tito Mukhopadhyay (Mukhopadhyay 2011), Stephen Shore (Shore 2003), and Daniel Tammet (Tammet 2006) to challenge longstanding assumptions about the nature of autistic cognitive impairment. In psychology and allied disciplines, researchers are detailing new kinds of sociality (Frith 1989;Happé, Briskman, and Frith 2001;Hobson 2014).…”
Section: S62mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In large part the result of the writings of autistic individuals, many of them activists (see, e.g., the works of Temple Grandin and Donna Williams), scholars are chipping away at the assumptions of deficit by identifying rationality, coherence, logic, creativity, and metaphor where these were assumed to be absent (Costa and Grinker 2018;Draaisma 2009;Savarese 2018). Following Biklen (2005), Hacking (2009), and others (see Osteen 2008), Costa and Grinker (2018), for example, draw on phenomenology and philosophy of mind in an analysis of firstperson accounts of autism by Sean Barron (Barron and Barron 2002), Lucy Blackman (Blackman 2001), Carly Fleischmann (Fleischmann 2012), Naoki Higashida (Higashida 2013), Tito Mukhopadhyay (Mukhopadhyay 2011), Stephen Shore (Shore 2003), and Daniel Tammet (Tammet 2006) to challenge longstanding assumptions about the nature of autistic cognitive impairment. In psychology and allied disciplines, researchers are detailing new kinds of sociality (Frith 1989;Happé, Briskman, and Frith 2001;Hobson 2014).…”
Section: S62mentioning
confidence: 99%