Authoritarian Cooptation of Civil Society: The Case of Belarus

Making Sense of a Surprise: Perspectives on the 2020 “Belarusian Revolution”

“…On the other hand, the regime had softened its initially hostile attitude toward the emerging civil society over the last couple of years, beginning to tolerate and even encourage “constructive” nonpolitical activities. In the second half of that decade, therefore, the continued suppression of opposition was accompanied by the selective co-optation of more “innocuous” segments of civil society, such as initiatives promoting the Belarusian language and heritage in the arts, education, and sports, as part of the regime’s “soft Belarusianisation” (Astapova et al 2022; Marin 2020).…”

“…When the COVID-19 pandemic hit the country in the spring of 2020, Lukaschenka’s approval ratings deteriorated further as he underestimated the seriousness of the disease, downplayed it, and ridiculed the victims instead of taking the political measures adopted in most European countries. In this situation, civil society stepped in and filled the void by disseminating information about the virus, mobilizing support for their fellow citizens, and providing emergency assistance to health workers (Astapova et al 2022; Marples 2021; Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021).…”

“…Second, while mobilization from below prompted by COVID-19 boosted the self-confidence and self-empowerment of “ordinary” citizens, the pattern of apolitical authoritarian co-optation remained intact. In fact, the joint effort marked the “apex of civil society’s ‘constructive’ collective action” (Astapova et al 2022, 20). Third, and most importantly, there was no suitable challenger to the incumbent to translate popular discontent into political action at the ballot box.…”

“…In Belarus, processes of collective identity formation had already been underway during the election campaign, when previously apolitical civil society experienced its “political reincarnation,” reallocating its resources from the co-optation period for political purposes and quickly forming support groups for Tsikhanouskya (Astapova et al 2022, 22–24). On the one hand, her team won sympathizers who identified with the candidate precisely because she was an unlikely one—a housewife instead of an established politician.…”

“…On the other, the participants in the signature-collection gatherings and preelection campaign rallies recognized themselves as citizens with a common goal. Among other things, this was expressed through the use of the white-red-white flag of the Republic of Belarus of 1918 and 1991–1995, which soon became a symbol of the struggle for “justice,” “truth,” and a “country that is worth living in.” During the fall of 2020, this politicization of a new, pluralist, and inclusive civic identity of a Belarusian “demos” that was different from the cultural and political patterns of the ethnocultural national movement of the 1990s became even more explicit and dynamic (Astapova et al 2022; Gerasimov 2020).…”