Audit team time reporting: An agency theory perspective

The Effects of Auditor Experience and Professional Commitment on Acceptance of Underreporting Time: A Moderated Mediation Analysis

“…Some empirical research on underreporting of time uses pre-manager level auditors, as auditors at the staff and senior levels have been found to engage in higher levels of underreporting behavior (Otley and Pierce 1996;Pierce and Sweeney 2003;Sweeney and Pierce 2006;Sweeney et al 2010). Nevertheless, other studies on underreporting time use samples consisting of auditors at various hierarchical ranks, from the staff through partner levels (e.g., S. Lightner, Adams, and K. Lightner 1982;Margheim and Pany 1986;Donnelly et al 2003;Donnelly, Quirin, and O'Bryan 2011;Paino, Smith, and Ismail 2012;Agoglia et al 2015;Barrainkua and Espinosa-Pike 2015). Lightner et al (1982) surveyed auditors at the staff through partner levels and did not find a significant relationship between auditor level and underreporting time.…”

“…Indeed, underreporting time is prevalent in public accounting (Otley and Pierce 1996;Shapeero and Killough 1999;Akers and Eaton 2003;Shapeero, Koh, and Killough 2003). While audit firms may have reduced emphasis on formal, explicit incentives to underreport time, recent empirical evidence suggests that auditors still feel at least implicit pressure to underreport (Agoglia, Hatfield, and Lambert 2015). In a recent interview study with auditors at Big 4 and regional firms, Church (2014, A31) documents that auditors feel pressure to work without charging the hours to the budget or ''eat time.''…”

The Determinants of Delay in Publication of Financial Statement

“…In this condition, agency theory shows the occurrence of type three involving the owner with the external part in the contract. The conflict is related to incentives from principals (companies) with agents (auditors) who tend to act in accordance with their personal interests if given the opportunity (Agoglia, Hatfield & Lambert., 2015). Wolf (1981) also saw a conflict occurring over audit involvement in which the audit manager acts as the agent of an audit firm and tends to have power over the day-to-day activities of his clients.…”

External Auditors' Judgment and Decision Making: An Audit Process Task Analysis

“…The impact of this context on auditors' behavior has received increased attention in the literature. Agoglia, Hatfield, and Lambert () examine how underreporting time on various clients is viewed by audit managers and audit partners. Their results suggest that, when the client is desirable (i.e., favorable auditor–client relations, non‐hectic audit timing, experienced audit partner, etc.…”