2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.10.022
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Auction winning, social dynamics and non-compliance in a payment for ecosystem services scheme in Indonesia

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Cited by 25 publications
(21 citation statements)
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References 31 publications
(46 reference statements)
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“…From Table 1, we can see some consistent themes emerging. For instance, questions related to payments and markets for ecosystem services, forestry, and gender differences increased, especially after 2015 [36,41,58] and those empirical observations corroborated the role of voluntary and mandatory policies for conservation based on farmer's dispositional factors such as environmental concerns and risk tolerance reported in other studies [8,10]. In addition, the papers analyzed in our sample suggest-as do other studies-that farmers with intrinsic motivations to protect the environment do not necessarily react negatively to extrinsic motivators and conservation payments [8].…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…From Table 1, we can see some consistent themes emerging. For instance, questions related to payments and markets for ecosystem services, forestry, and gender differences increased, especially after 2015 [36,41,58] and those empirical observations corroborated the role of voluntary and mandatory policies for conservation based on farmer's dispositional factors such as environmental concerns and risk tolerance reported in other studies [8,10]. In addition, the papers analyzed in our sample suggest-as do other studies-that farmers with intrinsic motivations to protect the environment do not necessarily react negatively to extrinsic motivators and conservation payments [8].…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Payment for environmental services (n = 2): A study in Indonesia [41] finds that longer-established farmers and those with larger plots were more likely to win PES auctions. Actual conservation compliance cost was about 115% greater than the bid outcome on average, and only about 55% of farmers completed their contracts.…”
Section: Individual Incentives Influence Cooperative Behaviormentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Market games and simulations-which have been common in South and Southeast Asia-reflect a longstanding interest in understanding individual and collective behaviors in the context of farm risk and inputs management [26,54,55]. Additional and complementary questions related to payments and markets for ecosystem services, forestry, and gender differences appeared after 2015 [29,44,56]. Trust and risk games, on the other hand, were among the most likely to characterize social preferences and behavior of farmers, usually in the context of cultivating crops.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A study in Indonesia [29] finds that longer-established farmers and those with larger plots were more likely to win PES auctions. Actual conservation compliance cost was about 115% greater than the bid outcome on average, and only about 55% of farmers completed their contracts.…”
Section: Payment For Environmental Services (N = 2)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In reality, auctions feature a number of unique and often difficult-to-quantify transaction costs, including collecting information, designing the tender process, administering the program, and monitoring compliance (for the auctioneer) and learning how to participate, formulate a bid, and estimate one's own opportunity costs (for the bidder) (see Section 3.5.2). In the field experiments in Tanzania and Indonesia, for instance, the researchers held mock auctions and practice rounds to familiarize participants with the bidding procedure [81,82]. In the laboratory, transaction costs are often neglected for experimental reasons [89], but there are exceptions: Messer et al [90], for instance, include a submission fee for each parcel submitted to mimic transaction costs.…”
Section: Economic Criteriamentioning
confidence: 99%