Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature

Klemperer, Paul

doi:10.2139/ssrn.172650

Cited by 82 publications

(68 citation statements)

References 105 publications

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“…27 and Jehiel et al's (1996) work on`externalities' was a notable exception, as is Jehiel and Moldovanu's (2001) recent model concerning market structure considerations inspired by the 3G auctions. See Klemperer (1999Klemperer ( , 2000b for summaries of the extensive auctions literature. 28 Furthermore, there is the possibility that the regulations might in some circumstances be altered so that the spectrum licensed for 2G purposes can be`refarmed' for 3G purposes (though the Government made clear that no commitments could be made on how and when refarming would be implemented).…”

Section: The Problem Of Entrymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences

Binmore

Klemperer²

2002

The Economic Journal

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325

161

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This paper reviews the part played by economists in organising the British third‐generation mobile‐phone licence auction that concluded on 27 April 2000. It raised £22½ billion ($34 billion or 2½% of GNP) and was widely described at the time as the biggest auction ever. We discuss the merits of auctions versus `beauty contests', the aims of the auction, the problems we faced, the auction designs we considered, and the mistakes that were made.

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Section: The Problem Of Entrymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences

Binmore

Klemperer²

2002

The Economic Journal

Self Cite

325

161

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“…Common-value auctions, in which the value of the object being sold is unknown but the same to all bidders ex post and each bidder receives a private signal that is correlated with the value, have been studied intensively, both theoretically and empirically, since Milgrom and Weber (MW) (1982); see the surveys by McAfee and McMillan (1987, Section X), Milgrom (1985, Section 4;1987, Section 4), Wilson (1992, Section 4.2), and Klemperer (1999).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

2007

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This paper proposes a structural non-equilibrium model of initial responses to incomplete-information games based on "level-k" thinking, which describes behavior in many experiments with complete-information games. We derive the model's implications in first-and second-price auctions with general information structures, compare them to equilibrium and Eyster and Rabin's (2005) "cursed equilibrium," and evaluate the model's potential to explain behavior in auction experiments. The level-k model generalizes many insights from equilibrium auction theory. It also allows a unified explanation of the winner's curse in common-value auctions and overbidding in those independent-private-value auctions without the uniform value distributions used in most experiments.

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“…• The proposal may risk increasing the wealth and power of stevedores. 13 For a good introduction to auction theory, see Klemperer (1999). For an important early contribution to this now vast literature, see Vickrey (1961).…”

Section: Concerns Over Price Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Port Botany’s Landside: Market Pricing to Address Congestion

Cox¹,

Mahoney²,

Smart³

2009

J of App Econs and Policy

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Endemic congestion at the road landside interface at Port Botany, Sydney results from coordination problems within the supply chain. These problems cannot be solved through the vertical integration of participants in the supply chain because of competition law considerations, and other non‐price solutions are unworkable. Government intervention is warranted, but in a minimal form targeted at the facilitation of slot pricing. This limited intervention would allow market dynamics to achieve an efficient solution.

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Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature

Cited by 82 publications

References 105 publications

The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences

The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences

Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

Port Botany’s Landside: Market Pricing to Address Congestion

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