Attributionism and Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias

Brownstein, Michael

doi:10.1007/s13164-015-0287-7

Cited by 39 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 81 publications

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“…One important focus in this line of research also involves the possibility that implicit attitudes predict or explain our beliefs and real-world behavior. For example, one central question in this line of research is whether agents can be morally responsible for discriminatory behaviors when those behaviors are caused by implicit attitudes (Brownstein 2016;Brownstein and Saul 2016;Holroyd 2012;Kelly and Roedder 2008;King and Carruthers 2012;Levy 2014Levy , 2017Washington and Kelly 2016). Is an agent morally responsible for a mistaken shooting, for instance, if this action was caused by attitudes that are beyond their ability to control?…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implicit attitudes and the ability argument

Buckwalter¹

2018

Philos Stud

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According to one picture of the mind, decisions and actions are largely the result of automatic cognitive processing beyond our ability to control. This picture is in tension with a foundational principle in ethics that moral responsibility for behavior requires the ability to control it. The discovery of implicit attitudes contributes to this tension. According to the ability argument against moral responsibility, if we cannot control implicit attitudes, and implicit attitudes cause behavior, then we cannot be morally responsible for that behavior. The purpose of this paper is to refute the ability argument. Drawing on both scientific evidence in cognitive science and philosophical arguments in ethics and action theory, I argue that it is invalid and unsound because current evidence is insufficient to establish the premises that (1) implicit attitudes are uncontrollable, (2) that they significantly cause behavior, (3) that responsibility always requires ability, and (4) that even if uncontrollable attitudes did fully cause behavior, this entails that the behavior they cause is uncontrollable. The rejection of the ability argument questions the priority of the unconscious over the conscious mind in cognitive science, deprioritizes ability in theories of moral responsibility in ethics, and provides a strong reason to uphold moral responsibility for implicitly biased behavior.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implicit attitudes and the ability argument

Buckwalter¹

2018

Philos Stud

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“…Withholding backward‐looking appraisive judgements and maintaining that the agent is responsible only in the forward‐looking sense of having remedial obligations may seem appealing for three reasons. First, one may have doubts about appraising an agent yet insist that it is important that someone is held responsible nonetheless (though see Holroyd, , Brownstein, , and the discussion in Section 3 below, for arguments addressing different versions of such doubts). As Zheng (: 74) puts it, it is important that we are held to forward‐looking responsibilities “because it is appropriate for us to clean up after our own actions when a mess has been made,” even if the mess does not reflect badly on us, or warrant blame.…”

Section: What Sense Of Responsibility?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Responsibility for implicit bias

2017

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A note on versions:The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher's version. Please see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that access may require a subscription.For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk Jules.Holroyd@nottingham.ac.uk Responsibility for Implicit BiasPhilosophers who have written about implicit bias have claimed or implied that individuals are not responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their implicit biases, and that this is a function of the nature of implicit bias as implicit: below the radar of conscious reflection, out of the control of the deliberating agent, and not rationally revisable in the way many of our reflective beliefs are.

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“…The term implicit bias has been used by some to refer to biased behaviour caused by an implicit attitude (e.g., Mandelbaum, , p. 631), and by others to refer to a mental item which causes biased behaviour (e.g., Brownstein, , p. 766; Levy, , p. 800). If we understand implicit biases as mental items, the claim that they belong to a certain mental kind is coherent.…”

Section: Implicit Biasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Biased by our imaginings

Sullivan-Bissett

2018

Mind & Language

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I propose a new model of implicit bias, according to which implicit biases are constituted by unconscious imaginings. I argue that my model accommodates characteristic features of implicit bias, does not face the problems of the doxastic model, and is uniquely placed to accommodate the structural heterogeneity in the category of implicit bias. Finally I turn to how my view relates to holding people accountable for their biases and what we know about intervention strategies.

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Attributionism and Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias

Cited by 39 publications

References 81 publications

Implicit attitudes and the ability argument

Implicit attitudes and the ability argument

Responsibility for implicit bias

Biased by our imaginings

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