Attentional Interference Effects of Emotional Pictures: Threat, Negativity, or Arousal?

Abstract

Attentional interference arising from emotional pictures was examined. Participants had to ignore emotional pictures while solving math problems (Study 1, N = 126) or detecting the location of a line (Study 2, N = 60). Data analyses tested predictions of 3 theories. Evolutionary threat theory predicts interference by snake pictures. Categorical negativity theory predicts interference by negative pictures regardless of their intensity. According to arousal theory, arousal level predicts interference effects. The results supported arousal theory, with the most arousing pictures (strong unpleasant pictures, oppositesex models) producing the strongest interference. The findings are interpreted in the context of process models of emotions that postulate an initial relevance check before further processing of valence and other appraisal dimensions.

Encouraging the perceptual underdog: Positive affective priming of nonpreferred local–global processes.

“…As noted within the circumplex view of emotion (e.g., Posner, Russell, & Peterson, 2005;Russell, 2003), although emotional states such as those of being elated or upset can be characterised as possessing opposite valences, they can also be characterised as possessing comparable arousal levels. As stated earlier, despite some evidence against the hypothesis that arousal mediates the effects of positive and negative affect in cognition (Isen et al, 1987;Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2006), the results of a number of studies have provided support for this hypothesis (Anderson, 2005;Keil & Ihssen, 2004;Robinson et al, 2004;Schimmack, 2005). In the present paradigm, the results of Experiment 2 show that the effect of valence on perceptual flexibility could have been mediated by arousal at most only partially, not wholly, because positive and negative primes were matched on arousal, but nevertheless differed in their promotion of cognitive flexibility.…”

Clearing the mind: A working memory model of distraction from negative mood.

“…Negative stimuli are generally more attention-grabbing than neutral or positive stimuli (Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006;Pratto & John, 1991). This processing advantage is stronger for strongly negative stimuli than for mildly negative stimuli (Schimmack, 2005). Strongly negative stimuli trigger more mood-congruent processing and, correspondingly, employ more working memory capacity than mildly negative stimuli (see Klein & Boals, 2001, for empirical evidence).…”

“…In line with a working memory model of distraction, we expected the intensity of negative mood reports to decrease when working memory load of a subsequent task would increase. Strongly negative pictures can be presumed to have a greater impact on working memory than mildly negative pictures (Schimmack, 2005). We therefore expected that a demanding task would attenuate participants' negative moods to a greater degree in response to strongly rather than mildly negative pictures.…”

Fenyegető ingerek hatása a figyelmi teljesítményre: Áttekintés

“…Például Schimmack (2005) kísérletében a résztvevőknek vagy matematikai példákat kellett megoldaniuk (két szorzat közül melyik a nagyobb), vagy egy vonal helyét meghatározniuk (a középpont alatt vagy felett villant-e fel), miközben érzelmi töltetű képeket kellett figyelmen kívül hagyniuk. Az érzelmi ingerek között szerepeltek kígyók és fegyverek is, valamint más, negatív és pozitív töltetű képek egyaránt.…”

“…Az érzelmi ingerek között szerepeltek kígyók és fegyverek is, valamint más, negatív és pozitív töltetű képek egyaránt. Schimmack (2005) figyelembe vette a kígyó detekciós elméletet, a negativitási elmé-letet (a negatív töltetű képek intenzitástól függetlenül a legnagyobb interferenciát keltik) és az arousalelméletet is. Eredményei szerint a valenciától függetlenül a legerő-sebb intenzitású képek váltották ki a legnagyobb interferenciát -mind a matematikai, mind a téri feladatban ekkor romlott legjobban a teljesítmény.…”