Attention to self-referential stimuli: Can I ignore my own face?

Abstract

Auto-referential materials (i.e., the own name) have been described as particularly prone to capture attention. Some recent studies have questioned this view and showed that these own name effects are temporary and appear only in specific conditions: when enough resources are available or when the own name is presented within the focus of attention if it is a task-irrelevant stimulus (Gronau et al., 2003). In the present study, a stimulus that is unique to each individual was used: the self-face. In Experiment 1, the selfface produced a temporary distraction when presented at fixation during a digit-parity task. However, this distraction was not different from that triggered by another highly familiar face. In Experiment 2, the self-face failed to produce interference when presented outside the focus of attention. These results confirm recent findings showing that auto-referential materials do not automatically summon attention and have a distractive power only in specific conditions.

Distinguishing three levels in explicit self-awareness

“…In spite of this, very few children (16%) failed the picture task, even under the relatively difficulty conditions through which the distractor faces had been selected to be as similar as possible to the subject. This result is in line with other studies showing that our own representation in processed in a specific way (Devue & Brédart 2008;Devue, Collette, Balteau, Degueldre, Luxen, Maquet & Brédart, 2007). It clearly follows from this argument that picture self-recognition task does not only assesses familiarity with certain facial features, but effectively constitutes one component of self-awareness.…”

The neural correlates of visual self-recognition

“…However, contrary to other self-related information our face is a unique self-referential stimulus, presumably our most distinctive physical feature (Tsakiris, 2008). Indeed, our own face is a property that we do not share with other people (with the exception of twins) whereas it is quite common to share properties such as the occupation, the hometown or even the name with other people (Devue & Brédart, 2008). During the last forty years, the ability of self-recognition in a mirror has been extensively investigated by researchers searching for signs of 'self-consciousness' or some sense of personal identity in infants and in animals (Amsterdam, 1972;Gallup, 1970; for a review see Keenan, Gallup, & Falk, 2003a).…”

Do Pictures of Faces, and Which Ones, Capture Attention in the Inattentional-Blindness Paradigm?

“…It could be that in studies showing`self effects' self-referential stimuli did not capture attention but actually caused a difficulty to disengage attention because the paradigms used allowed the participants to attend to those stimuli (eg if the self-referential stimuli were located within the observer's focus of attention ösee Devue and Bre¨dart 2008;Shapiro et al 1997;Wolford and Morrison 1980; or if task demands allowed attentional shifts towards peripheral self-referential stimuliösee Bre¨dart et al 2006). In those studies`self-effects' were either reflected in an increase or in a decrease in performance.…”

“…This assumption is supported by our recognition data: once a face had attracted attention (because of its facial properties per se) and this face happened to be a familiar face, it was better recognised than a novel face. On the other hand, self-referential stimuli could also interfere with other tasks (ie an increase of reaction times or of error rates ösee eg Devue and Bre¨dart 2008;Wolford and Morrison 1980). This interference could be explained by a difficulty to disengage attention from those stimuli once they are attended by the observer.…”

“…This study suggests that familiar faces could be better detected than unfamiliar ones but does not allow any predictions about one's own face. Actually, few studies Devue and Bre¨dart 2008;Laarni et al 2000;Ninomiya et al 1998;Tong and Nakayama 1999) have used own faces to investigate the attentional properties of self-referential stimuli. Previous studies used own names rather than own faces (see eg Bundesen et al 1997;Gronau et al 2003;Kawahara and Yamada 2004;Mack et al 2002;Mack and Rock 1998;Wolford and Morrison 1980).…”