There is a wealth of evidence showing enhanced attention toward drug-related information (i.e., attentional bias) in substance abusers. However, little is known about attentional bias in deregulated behaviors without substance use such as abnormal gambling. This study examined whether problem gamblers (PrG, as assessed through self-reported gambling-related craving and gambling dependence severity) exhibit attentional bias for gambling-related cues. Forty PrG and 35 control participants performed a change detection task using the flicker paradigm, in which two images differing in only one aspect are repeatedly flashed on the screen until the participant is able to report the changing item. In our study, the changing item was either neutral or related to gambling. Eye movements were recorded, which made it possible to measure both initial orienting of attention as well as its maintenance on gambling information. Direct (eye-movements) and indirect (change in detection latency) measures of attention in individuals with problematic gambling behaviors suggested the occurrence of both engagement and of maintenance attentional biases toward gambling-related visual cues. Compared to nonproblematic gamblers, PrG exhibited (a) faster reaction times to gambling-cues as compared to neutral cues, (b) higher percentage of initial saccades directed toward gambling pictures, and (c) an increased fixation duration and fixation count on gambling pictures. In the PrG group, measures of gambling-related attentional bias were not associated with craving for gambling and gambling dependence severity. Theoretical and clinical implications of these results are discussed.

Faces and self-referential material (eg one's own name) are more likely to capture attention in the inattentional-blindness (IB) paradigm than other stimuli. This effect is presumably due to the meaning of these stimuli rather than to their familiarity [Mack and Rock, 1998 Inattentional Blindness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)]. In previous work, IB has been investigated mostly with schematic stimuli. In the present study, the generalisability of this finding was tested with photographic stimuli. In support of the view that faces constitute a special category of stimuli, pictures of faces were found to resist more to IB than pictures of common objects (experiment 1) or than pictures of inverted faces (experiment 2). In a third experiment, the influence of face familiarity and identity (the participant's own face, a friend's face, and an unknown face) on IB rates was evaluated. Unexpectedly, no differential resistence to blindness across these three kinds of faces was found. In conclusion, pictures of faces attracted attention more than pictures of objects or inverted faces in the IB paradigm. However, this effect was not dependent on face familiarity or identity.

We tested the effects of using a prosthesis for substitution of vision with audition (PSVA) on sensitivity to the Ponzo illusion. The effects of visual experience on the susceptibility to this illusion were also assessed. In one experiment, both early-blind and blindfolded sighted volunteers used the PSVA to explore several variants of the Ponzo illusion as well as control stimuli. No effects of the illusion were observed. The results indicate that subjects focused their attention on the two central horizontal bars of the stimuli, without processing the contextual cues that convey perspective in the Ponzo figure. In a second experiment, we required subjects to use the PSVA to consider the two converging oblique lines of the stimuli before comparing the length of the two horizontal bars. Here we were able to observe susceptibility to the Ponzo illusion in the sighted group, but to a lesser extent than in a sighted non-PSVA control group. No clear effect of the ilusion was obtained in early-blind subjects. These results suggest that, at least in sighted subjects, perception obtained with the PSVA shares perceptual processes with vision. Visual experience appears mandatory for a Ponzo illusion to occur with the PSVA.

Does the maintenance of feature bindings in visual short-term memory (VSTM) require sustained focused attention? This issue was investigated in three experiments, in which memory for single features (i.e., colors or shapes) was compared with memory for feature bindings (i.e., the link between the color and shape of an object). Attention was manipulated during the memory retention interval with a retro-cue, which allows attention to be directed and focused on a subset of memory items. The retro-cue was presented 700 ms after the offset of the memory display and 700 ms before the onset of the test display. If the maintenance of feature bindings - but not of individual features - in memory requires sustained focused attention, the retro-cue should not affect memory performance. Contrary to this prediction, we found that both memory for feature bindings and memory for individual features were equally improved by the retro-cue. Therefore, this finding does not support the view that the sustained focused attention is needed to properly maintain feature bindings in VSTM.

Using a simple change detection task involving vertical and horizontal stimuli, I. M. Thornton and D. Fernandez-Duque (2000) showed that the implicit detection of a change in the orientation of an item influences performance in a subsequent orientation judgment task. However, S. R. Mitroff, D. J. Simons, and S. L. Franconeri (2002) were not able to replicate this finding after correcting for confounds and thus attributed Thornton and Fernandez-Duque's results to methodological artifacts. Because Mitroff et al.'s failure to replicate might in turn have stemmed from several methodological differences between their study and those of Thornton and Fernandez-Duque (2000) and Fernandez-Duque and Thornton, the current authors set out to conduct a further replication in which they corrected all known methodological biases identified so far. The results suggest that implicit change detection indeed occurs: People's conscious decisions about the orientation of an item appear to be influenced by previous undetected changes in the orientation of other items in the display. Implications of this finding in light of current theories of visual awareness are discussed.