2008
DOI: 10.1098/rsta.2008.0019
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Attacker–defender models and road network vulnerability

Abstract: The reliability of road networks depends directly on their vulnerability to disruptive incidents, ranging in severity from minor disruptions to terrorist attacks. This paper presents a game theoretic approach to the analysis of road network vulnerability. The approach posits predefined disruption, attack or failure scenarios and then considers how to use the road network so as to minimize the maximum expected loss in the event of one of these scenarios coming to fruition. A mixed route strategy is adopted, mea… Show more

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Cited by 118 publications
(60 citation statements)
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“…Currently, vulnerability analysis of urban rail transit networks mainly refers to the research achievements in road network systems [13][14][15][16]. Gao and Shi [17] proposed an evaluation model of metro system invulnerability based on network topology and calculated the evaluation indices with matrix logic.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Currently, vulnerability analysis of urban rail transit networks mainly refers to the research achievements in road network systems [13][14][15][16]. Gao and Shi [17] proposed an evaluation model of metro system invulnerability based on network topology and calculated the evaluation indices with matrix logic.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Of particular importance, new relevant approaches can be developed to assess the reliability of the maritime in the context of the complex network theory (Bichou, 2005;Angeloudis et al, 2006;Bell et. al, 2008).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Bell introduces a two-player non-cooperative game between a network user, who seeks to minimize expected travel cost, and an adversary, who chooses link performance scenarios to maximize the travel cost [4,5]. The Nash equilibrium of this game can be used to measure network performance when users are pessimistic and, hence, may be used for cautious network design.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%