Security and Risk-Based Models in Shipping and Ports

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in SECURITY AND RISK-BASED MODELS IN SHIPPING AND PORTS: REVIEW AND CRITICAL ANALYSISRevised 2-12-08 Khalid BichouCentre for Transport Studies, Imperial College London, UK ABSTRACTThe primary aim of maritime security assessment models is to assess the level of security within and across the maritime network. When managing risk through legislation, regulatory assessment models are used to assess risk levels and examine the impact of policy options, usually in terms of the costs and benefits of a regulatory proposal. This paper reviews the development, application and adequacy of existing risk assessment and management models to maritime and port security. In particular, we examine the problematical issues of security perception, value and impact, and discuss the limitations of the current regulatory framework in providing an integrated and effective approach to risk assessment and management, including for supply chain security.

Vulnerability assessment of ports and industrial clusters against catastrophes

“…Hazards that lead to port risks shown in the earlier literature include security events, Chapter 2 Literature Review 20 fire and explosion, overtopping, oil spill, collision, grounding, earthquake, and climate change (Werner, 1998;Atsushi et al, 2004;Pachakis and Kiremidjian, 2004;Roeder et al, 2005 Pinto andTalley, 2006;Bichou, 2008;Moser et al, 2009;Na and Shinozuka, 2009;Yang et al, 2009;Zhang and Lam, 2015). There also exists a few literature which does not specify hazard types (Ronza et al, 2003;Darbra and Casal, 2004;Yip, 2008;Mokhtari et al, 2011;John et al, 2014).…”

“…McGill et al (2007) identify terrorist attack, sabotage, arson, and surveillance system failure as major security incident types. Earlier research focuses are laid on the identification of terrorist targets (Pinto and Talley, 2006), the discussion of potential risk assessment methods (Yang et al, 2009), and the estimation of ex-ante costs of international anti-terrorist initiatives (Bichou, 2008). Pinto and Talley (2006) find that the potential terrorists' targets may include ships, underwater mines, channels, oil tanks, and even containers.…”

“…These regulatory measures involve the International Ship and Port Facility Security code (ISPS), the IMO/ILO code of practice on security in ports, and the Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (SAFE Framework). In recent works, the research focus has been transferred from the studies of the prescriptive details of the measures and their ex-ante costs of compliance to the maritime risk assessment and management models (Bichou, 2008). Another type of events that will cause short-term or long-term port disruptions caused by intended purposes is labour strike.…”