Attack monitoring and localization in All-Optical Networks

Abstract

An attacker's connection can propagate quickly to different parts of a transparent All-Optical Network. Such attacks affect the normal traffic and cause a quality of service degradation or outright service denial. Attack monitors can collect the information of each link and each node to help diagnose the attacker's exact location.Quick detection and localization of an attack source helps avoid losing large amounts of data in an all-optical network. However, to detect attack sources, it is not necessary to put monitors on all nodes. Since not every wavelength on every link is being used all the time, we propose to use the idle wavelengths to setup diagnostic connections and obtain the necessary information needed for diagnosis purposes. We show that placing a relatively small number of monitors at some key nodes in a network is sufficient to achieve level of performance. However, the monitor placement policy, routing policy, and diagnosis method are challenging problems.We, in this paper, first develop a monitor placement policy, a test connection policy, and a routing policy based on our definition of crosstalk attack and monitor node models. With these policies, we show that we can always detect and localize the malicious connections as long as there is no more than one malicious connection on each wavelength in the whole network. After this, we develop a scalable diagnosis method, which can localize the sources of the such malicious attacks in a fast manner.

Optimal crosstalk monitoring and identification method for All-Optical Networks

“…Consequently, the occupation area of CIMS depends on the dimension of node. Compared with other proposed methods [10] and [7], it is obvious clear that this method is more advantageous, offering the benefit of rapid and accurate detection of performance degradation in AON components. Thus, it may ensure relaxing the high cost and complexity of signal quality monitoring in AONs.…”

“…As a direct consequence, this method offers relaxation from the high cost and complexity of signal quality monitoring for future AON management solutions. The need to localize the source of crosstalk and identifY their nature in AON has been explained and justified in several works [7], [8] and [9].One of the serious problems with these works are the fact that they are very complex and very expensive in the implementation phase. Within this framework, the main goal of the novel approach is to detect and localize crosstalk with a minimum of complexity and cost.…”

“…However, most of these methods are too difficult to implement in every AON component or require access to the electrical domain [3]- [5]. Although there are many reasons why crosstalk attacks must be detected and identified at any point in the network where they may occur, it has been shown that it is not necessary to put monitors at all AON nodes [6], [7]. Furthermore, it has been shown that monitoring information for any established lightpath on the input and output sides of each OXC node is sufficient to localize the source of multiple crosstalk attacks and to identifY their natures in AONs [8].…”

A Novel Fault Detection and Localization Scheme for Mesh All-optical Networks Based on Monitoring-cycles

“…For example, some authors proposed a diagnosis method with sparse monitoring nodes (multiple monitors may be required) particularly for crosstalk attacks, which could be considered as special cases of network faults in a wide sense [9,10]. In this paper, we propose a general approach at the physical layer for fault detection and localization in AONs through decomposing the given network into a set of cycles, which form a cycle cover for the network.…”

Performance Monitoring Method for All-Optical Networks

“…However, most of these methods are too difficult to implement in every AON component or require access to the electrical domain [3]- [5]. Although there are many reasons why crosstalk attacks must be detected and identified at any point in the network where they may occur, it has been shown that it is not necessary to put monitors at all AON nodes [6], [7]. Furthermore, it has been shown that monitoring information for any established lightpath on the input and output sides of each optical cross-connect (OXC) node is sufficient to localize the source of multiple crosstalk attacks and to identify their natures in AONs [8].…”