ATRIUM: Runtime attestation resilient under memory attacks

Zeitouni, Shaza; Dessouky, Ghada; Arias, Orlando; Sullivan, Dean; Ibrahim, Ahmad; Jin, Yier; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza

doi:10.1109/iccad.2017.8203803

Cited by 67 publications

(61 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Embedded security architectures are highly integrated into the system-on-a-chip (SoC) designs and not easily attacked [36].…”

Section: A Adversary Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Control-Flow Attestation. Several schemes for control-flow attestation have been recently proposed [2], [15], [36], [14]: C-FLAT [2] enables a prover to attest the exact control-flow path of an executed program to a remote verifier. However, C-FLAT is not scalable and poses high verification overhead on the verifier.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Static attestation approaches provide a proof that the software initially loaded by the prover is unmodified [33], [25], [16], but cannot detect run-time attacks that exploit, for instance, code-reuse techniques [34], [9], [17]. Recently progress has been made in tackling the static character of conventional attestation: The work in [2], [15], [36], [14] proposes controlflow attestation of the code running on the prover device. This enables the verifier to detect run-time attacks based on code reuse.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

DIAT: Data Integrity Attestation for Resilient Collaboration of Autonomous Systems

Abera

Bahmani

Brasser

et al. 2019

Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium

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“…Embedded security architectures are highly integrated into the system-on-a-chip (SoC) designs and not easily attacked [36].…”

Section: A Adversary Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

DIAT: Data Integrity Attestation for Resilient Collaboration of Autonomous Systems

Abera

Bahmani

Brasser

et al. 2019

Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium

Self Cite

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“…Run-time attestation schemes [1,9,10,29] can only detect, but not prevent, control-flow and non-control-data attacks.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

HardScope

Nyman

Dessouky

Zeitouni

et al. 2019

Proceedings of the 56th Annual Design Automation Conference 2019

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Memory-unsafe programming languages like C and C++ leave many (embedded) systems vulnerable to attacks like control-flow hijacking. However, defenses against control-flow attacks, such as (finegrained) randomization or control-flow integrity are ineffective against data-oriented attacks and more expressive Data-oriented Programming (DOP) attacks that bypass state-of-the-art defenses. We propose run-time scope enforcement (RSE), a novel approach that efficiently mitigates all currently known DOP attacks by enforcing compile-time memory safety constraints like variable visibility rules at run-time. We present Hardscope, a proof-of-concept implementation of hardware-assisted RSE for RISC-V, and show it has a low performance overhead of 3.2% for embedded benchmarks.

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“…These protocols do not guarantee the software integrity against an adversary that performs code reuse attack by exploiting memory corruption vulnerabilities to deviate an intended control-flow of a software by only changing the control-flow pointers at the runtime of an existing code, or non-control data attacks by manipulating some variables that make the control flow to follow a valid but non authorized direction. To mitigate the runtime attacks, some other attestation approaches have emerged in checking the correctness of the application during the execution time [9], [10], [11]. However, existing remote attestation schemes do not consider an interoperable IoT system, in which a compromised distributed service can impact the integrity of other devices of the distributed IoT services that interact with the malicious remote service.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

RADIS: Remote Attestation of Distributed IoT Services

Conti

Dushku

Mancini

2019

2019 Sixth International Conference on Software Defined Systems (SDS)

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Remote attestation is a security technique by which a potentially untrusted device called Prover can evidence its current state to an external trusted party called Verifier. The main goal of a remote attestation protocol is to guarantee the reliability of the evidence, such that the Verifier can verify remotely the trustworthiness of the Prover. In the Internet of Things (IoT) systems, which are increasingly becoming exposed to a broad range of exploitations, the existing remote attestation protocols aim to check the integrity of each individual IoT device by detecting the modified softwares and physical tampering attacks. However, in an interconnected IoT system, in which IoT devices interact autonomously among themselves, a compromised IoT service can influence the genuine operation of other invoked service, without changing the software.In this paper, we show how a compromised service in a distributed IoT service can induce malicious behavior on genuine services, and we highlight the need for distributed services attestation. We propose a protocol for Remote Attestation of Distributed IoT Services (RADIS), which provides a complete evidence about the trustworthiness of distributed IoT services. RADIS relies on a control-flow attestation technique to detect IoT services that perform an unexpected operation due to their interactions with a malicious remote service. Additionally, RADIS traces the interactions between IoT distributed services, allowing the Verifier to check whether the activities follow a legitimate interaction model. We discuss the effectiveness of our protocol in validating the integrity status of a distributed IoT service.

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ATRIUM: Runtime attestation resilient under memory attacks

Cited by 67 publications

References 11 publications

DIAT: Data Integrity Attestation for Resilient Collaboration of Autonomous Systems

DIAT: Data Integrity Attestation for Resilient Collaboration of Autonomous Systems

HardScope

RADIS: Remote Attestation of Distributed IoT Services

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