Storage outsourcing is a rising trend which prompts a number of interesting security issues, many of which have been extensively investigated in the past. However, Provable Data Possession (PDP) is a topic that has only recently appeared in the research literature. The main issue is how to frequently, efficiently and securely verify that a storage server is faithfully storing its client's (potentially very large) outsourced data. The storage server is assumed to be untrusted in terms of both security and reliability. (In other words, it might maliciously or accidentally erase hosted data; it might also relegate it to slow or off-line storage.) The problem is exacerbated by the client being a small computing device with limited resources. Prior work has addressed this problem using either public key cryptography or requiring the client to outsource its data in encrypted form. In this paper, we construct a highly efficient and provably secure PDP technique based entirely on symmetric key cryptography, while not requiring any bulk encryption. Also, in contrast with its predecessors, our PDP technique allows outsourcing of dynamic data, i.e, it efficiently supports operations, such as block modification, deletion and append
Machine-learning (ML) enables computers to learn how to recognise patterns, make unintended decisions, or react to a dynamic environment. The effectiveness of trained machines varies because of more suitable ML algorithms or because superior training sets. Although ML algorithms are known and publicly released, training sets may not be reasonably ascertainable and, indeed, may be guarded as trade secrets. In this paper we focus our attention on ML classifiers and on the statistical information that can be unconsciously or maliciously revealed from them. We show that it is possible to infer unexpected but useful information from ML classifiers. In particular, we build a novel meta-classifier and train it to hack other classifiers, obtaining meaningful information about their training sets. Such information leakage can be exploited, for example, by a vendor to build more effective classifiers or to simply acquire trade secrets from a competitor's apparatus, potentially violating its intellectual property rights
Wireless sensor networks are often deployed in hostile environments, where anadversary can physically capture some of the nodes. Once a node is captured, the attackercan re-program it and replicate the node in a large number of clones, thus easily taking over the network. The detection of node replication attacks in a wireless sensor network is therefore a fundamental problem. A few distributed solutions have recently been proposed. However, these solutions are not satisfactory. First, they are energy and memory demanding: A serious drawback for any protocol that is to be used in resource constrained environment such as a sensor network. Further, they are vulnerable to specific adversary models introduced in this paper. The contributions of this work are threefold. First, we analyze the desirable properties of a distributed mechanism for the detection of node replication attacks. Second, we show that the known solutions for this problem do not completely meet our requirements. Third, we propose a new Randomized, Efficient, and Distributed (RED) protocol for the detection of node replication attacks and we show that it is completely satisfactory with respect to the requirements. Extensive simulations also show that our protocol is highly efficient in communication, memory, and computation, that it sets out an improved attack detection probability compared to the best solutions in the literature, and that it is resistant to the new kind of attacks we introduce in this paper, while other solutions are not. Copyright 2007 ACM
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are often deployed in hostile environments where an adversary can physically capture some of the nodes, first can reprogram, and then, can replicate them in a large number of clones, easily taking control over the network. A few distributed solutions to address this fundamental problem have been recently proposed. However, these solutions are not satisfactory. First, they are energy and memory demanding: A serious drawback for any protocol to be used in the WSN-resource-constrained environment. Further, they are vulnerable to the specific adversary models introduced in this paper. The contributions of this work are threefold. First, we analyze the desirable properties of a distributed mechanism for the detection of node replication attacks. Second, we show that the known solutions for this problem do not completely meet our requirements. Third, we propose a new self-healing, Randomized, Efficient, and Distributed (RED) protocol for the detection of node replication attacks, and we show that it satisfies the introduced requirements. Finally, extensive simulations show that our protocol is highly efficient in communication, memory, and computation; is much more effective than competing solutions in the literature; and is resistant to the new kind of attacks introduced in this paper, while other solutions are not
We give, for the first time, a precise mathematical analysis of the connectivity and security proper-\ud ties of sensor networks that make use of the random predistribution of keys. We also show how to\ud set the parameters—pool and key ring size—in such a way that the network is not only connected\ud with high probability via secure links but also provably resilient, in the following sense: We for-\ud mally show that any adversary that captures sensors at random with the aim of compromising\ud a constant fraction of the secure links must capture at least a constant fraction of the nodes of\ud the network. In the context of wireless sensor networks where random predistribution of keys is\ud employed, we are the first to provide a mathematically precise proof, with a clear indication of\ud parameter choice, that two crucial properties—connectivity via secure links and resilience against\ud malicious attacks—can be obtained simultaneously. We also show in a mathematically rigorous\ud way that the network enjoys another strong security property. The adversary cannot partition\ud the network into two linear size components, compromising all the links between them, unless it\ud captures linearly many nodes. This implies that the network is also fault tolerant with respect to\ud node failures. Our theoretical results are complemented by extensive simulations that reinforce\ud our main conclusions
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