Atheists and Agnostics Are More Reflective than Religious Believers: Four Empirical Studies and a Meta-Analysis

Abstract

Individual differences in the mere willingness to think analytically has been shown to predict religious disbelief. Recently, however, it has been argued that analytic thinkers are not actually less religious; rather, the putative association may be a result of religiosity typically being measured after analytic thinking (an order effect). In light of this possibility, we report four studies in which a negative correlation between religious belief and performance on analytic thinking measures is found when religious belief is measured in a separate session. We also performed a meta-analysis on all previously published studies on the topic along with our four new studies (N = 15,078, k = 31), focusing specifically on the association between performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test (the most widely used individual difference measure of analytic thinking) and religious belief. This meta-analysis revealed an overall negative correlation (r) of -.18, 95% CI [-.21, -.16]. Although this correlation is modest, self-identified atheists (N = 133) scored 18.7% higher than religiously affiliated individuals (N = 597) on a composite measure of analytic thinking administered across our four new studies (d = .72). Our results indicate that the association between analytic thinking and religious disbelief is not caused by a simple order effect. There is good evidence that atheists and agnostics are more reflective than religious believers.

Analytic cognitive style, not delusional ideation, predicts data gathering in a large beads task study

“…Nevertheless, the present study did find evidence that analytic cognitive style is negatively associated with both religious belief and paranormal belief, which is consistent with earlier research (Pennycook et al, 2015;Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016). These contrasting results leave us with a question: why did we find associations with religious belief and paranormal belief, but not delusional ideation?…”

“Spiritual but not religious”: Cognition, schizotypy, and conversion in alternative beliefs

“…Non-religious participants, on the other hand, appear to be less prone to any of these intuitions. Moreover, these differences are not accounted for by differences in analytic thinking, which in previous research has been shown to be related to lower religious belief (see Pennycook et al, 2012;Pennycook et al, 2016;Shenhav et al, 2012).…”

“…Analytic thinking. Previous research has linked analytic thinking to religious disbelief (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012, Study 1;Pennycook et al, 2012;Pennycook et al, 2016;Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012). Similarly, religious participants tend to score lower on analytic thinking measures than the nonreligious.…”

“…This supports the idea that cognitive biases underlie supernatural belief generally, rather than only religious belief specifically. We include analytic thinking as an additional variable to assess whether the relationship between cognitive biases and supernatural belief holds above and beyond analytic tendencies, which previously have been found to be associated with religious belief (see Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012, Study 1;Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012;Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016).…”

What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement

“…Stanovich (e.g., 2004;2009b) has argued that thinking disposition is an underappreciated determinant of psychological outcomes. Recent research has supported the idea that cognitive style plays a consequential role in psychological domains that are of some general import (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015b): e.g., creativity (Barr, Pennycook, Stolz, & Fugelsang, 2014), moral judgments and values (Paxton, Unger, & Greene, 2012;Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2014b;Rozyman, Landy, & Goodwin, 2014), religious belief (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012;Pennycook et al, 2014a;Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2013;Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016;Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012), bullshit receptivity (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015), and even Smartphone technology use (Barr, Pennycook, Stolz, & Fugelsang, 2015 …”