2014
DOI: 10.1007/s12197-014-9286-2
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Asymmetry and revenue in second-price auctions: a majorization approach

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Cited by 2 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…In general, auction can be classified into open ascending price auction (English auction), open descending price auction (Dutch auction), sealed first-price auction (FPA), sealed second-price auction (SPA) and so on (see the monograph Krishna [16]). Recently, there have been some recent works concentrated on the effect of bidders' asymmetries on revenue in FPA and SPA (see [8,9,12]). For example, Chen and Xu studied the effect of bidder asymmetry on the revenue in SPA with the help of the useful tool of majorization.…”
Section: Auction Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In general, auction can be classified into open ascending price auction (English auction), open descending price auction (Dutch auction), sealed first-price auction (FPA), sealed second-price auction (SPA) and so on (see the monograph Krishna [16]). Recently, there have been some recent works concentrated on the effect of bidders' asymmetries on revenue in FPA and SPA (see [8,9,12]). For example, Chen and Xu studied the effect of bidder asymmetry on the revenue in SPA with the help of the useful tool of majorization.…”
Section: Auction Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%