Asymmetrical Perceptions of Power in Crises: A Comparison of 1914 and the Cuban Missile Crisis

Abstract

Archival content analysis studies of British and German newspapers and diplomatic documents in 1914 showed an increasingly asymmetrical pattern of perceived intentions. Levels of power motive imagery in reports or paraphrases of statements by the 'other' side were accentuated, while levels in reports or paraphrases of statements by one's own (favored) side were diminished. As a result, the overall sense of threat was increased. In contrast, an archival study of US and Soviet newspapers during the peacefully resolved 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis showed no such pattern of asymmetrical accentuation-diminution. These results confirm a pattern of perceived intentions previously found in other escalating conflict situations, and are consistent with many related social psychological phenomena and experimental results. These findings suggest that comparing mutual perceptions of power imagery is a precise, operational way to measure 'threatening' intentions and thus an important mechanism of conflict escalation.

Words of swords in the Caucasus: About a leading indicator of conflicts.

“…This was a war that was predicted by both the integrative complexity indicator of conflicts of Suedfeld and Tetlock (1977) and the motive dictionary (Hogenraad, 2005, p. 138). We also detected the trend toward appeasement in the 1962 13-day Cuban Missile Crisis (October 16-28; Hogenraad, 2007), a trend already noted by Winter (1993, p. 540;Winter, 2003) and by Guttieri, Wallace, and Suedfeld (1995;Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977). We also predicted (Hogenraad, 2005) the increasing risk of war in Iraq from the speeches (September 11, 2001-March 20, 2003 of President G. W. Bush and Prime Minister Blair before the Anglo-American action in Iraq in 2003; and we predicted a decreasing risk of war in the Irish Republican Army (IRA) negotiations (Hogenraad, 2008) that lasted from 1996 to 2007 until the St. Andrew's agreement of October 2006 ending a 38-year British campaign.…”

Measuring Implicit British Perceptions of German Intentions in 1938–1939

“…For example, an increase—for whatever reason—in Country A 's expressed level of power motivation (phase 1) leads to aggressive actions such as military threats or exploitative negotiations (see Winter, 1993, 2007). Through a distorted attribution process (phase 2), the media and policy makers of Country B then exaggerate the levels of power motive imagery in the communications and public statements of Country A —thereby increasing the perceived threat (as demonstrated by Winter, 1987, 2003). In phase 3, this increased threat increases levels of power motivation in Country B (Langner & Winter, 2001; Peterson et al., 1994), which is reflected in its aggressive actions.…”

Rising Power on the Mind

“…Jervis 1968;Winter 2003;Winter and Sweet 2009. One topic from respondents' rationales, "Keep Commitments," focused on how it is wrong to break previous agreements even if you have an advantage. Here individuals noted that the US should be consistent and keep its commitments, that honoring previous agreements is important, and that just because circumstances have changed doesn't mean that the US should shift away from a previous commitment.…”

“…Another important finding is that individuals respond to being a declining power differently from how they respond to their 70. Jervis 1968;Winter 2003;Winter and Sweet 2009. 71.…”